News

Tracking Number:  256647

Title:  "Nations Examine BWC Verification Compliance Measures." According to Ambassador Edward Lacey, acting Assistant ACDA Director, the US and other parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) have conducted a thorough examination of verification measures that might be used in the future to enhance compliance with the convention. (921203)

Translated Title:  L'ONU autorise l'emploi de la force en Somalie.; Le respect des mesures sur les armes biologiques. (921203)
Author:  NEWMANN, ROBIN (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date:  19921203

Text:
NATIONS EXAMINE BWC VERIFICATION COMPLIANCE MEASURES

(U.S. open-minded but skeptical, Lacey says) (800) By Robin Newmann USIA European Correspondent Geneva -- The United States and other parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) have conducted a "thorough examination" of verification measures that might be used in the future to enhance compliance with the convention, according to a ranking U.S. arms control official.

Ambassador Edward Lacey, acting Assistant Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), said in an interview in Geneva December 3, that 21 potential measures, ranging from better information monitoring and exchange on the legitimate use of biological agents, to on-site inspection of facilities capable of producing agents for military purposes were examined during a two-week BWC convention here.

The convention, which has 118 parties, prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological (bacteriological) and toxin (organic poisons) weapons. It has confidence-building measures to deter illegal biological activities but no verification regime because of the difficulty of distinguishing biological agents used for legitimate civilian purposes as opposed to those destined for biological warfare.

The 1991 BWC Review Conference called on parties to "identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint" and to report on their feasibility by the end of 1993. The two-week conference in Geneva, scheduled to end December 4, was the second meeting of government experts on the subject.

According to Lacey, participants examined 21 suggested measures and grouped them into seven broad categories for in-depth evaluation when BWC experts meet again next year.

The seven categories include: -- Information monitoring: the monitoring of all possible biological warfare-related information available in the public domain, including national legislation, environmental impact statements, export regulations, scientific journals and newspapers.

-- Data exchange: the possibility of requiring all parties to the BWC to submit data at regular intervals on such items as vaccine production plants, and imports and exports of biological and bacteriological agents. Lacey recalled that countries are currently required to provide some data on their biological activities but that fewer than 50 percent of the 118 states-parties have done so. (Lacey noted that the United States -- which abandoned its biological weapons programs when the BWC entered into force in the early 1970s -- had provided "everything that was required" in the enhanced data exchange agreement under the convention, "including a declaration with respect to previous defensive and offensive biological weapons programs.")

-- Remote-sensing: the use of commercially available satellite imagery, traditional or infra-red photography from aircraft, radar, and ground-based biological sensors to confirm the presence of biological and bacteriological agents.

-- Off-site inspections: inspection activity outside a specific facility, such as a vaccine production plant or a military installation. Such activity could include interviewing people from the area, taking environmental samples of soil, water or air around the suspected facility, and auditing publicly available documents related to the facility.

-- Exchange visits: the exchange of visits by scientists and researchers for short periods or long-term research projects to enhance confidence in what another country is doing in the biological field.

-- On-site inspections: the sending of an international inspection team to visit a suspected site at any time to look for evidence of non-compliance with the BWC.

-- Continuous monitoring: the continuous monitoring using instruments and personnel, 24 hours a day, of a particular installation to monitor the processes going on there and minimize the possibility of illegal biological activities being pursued at the facility. Lacey recalled that under the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, some 30 U.S. inspectors and equipment are stationed outside the Russian missile assembly plant at Votkinsk, as part of the treaty's verification regime. (Russian inspectors also continuously monitor a U.S. rocket plant in Magna, Utah.)

Lacey said the United States had not proposed any measures since it was skeptical about the possibility of developing a verification regime for the BWC, but remained "open- minded" and would look at any measures proposed.

He noted that the United States "has agreed and is committed to do a scientific and technical evaluation objectively, of all proposed measures."

Lacey also pointed out that the international verification and inspection regime developed for the recently completed chemical weapons ban is not necessarily applicable to biological weapons. He explained that biological agents can be produced in a much smaller facility than chemical agents, which require sizable plants, making their monitoring much more difficult.

Additionally, he said, bacteria have to be grown to produce vaccines, for example, in the same way as they are grown for illegal biological warfare purposes, making it difficult to verify the legality of such activity until the agents are placed in munitions ready for use.

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