Title:  "US Stresses Compliance with Biological Weapons Pact." While the US supports the Biological Weapons Convention, Michael Moodie of the ACDA says that ways to strengthen and improve the convention should be addressed at a review conference scheduled next month. (910828)

Translated Title:  Il faut respecter l`accord sur les armes biologiques.; EU recalca cumplimiento pacto sobre armas biologicas. (910828)
Author:  PORTH, JACQUELYN S (USIA STAFF WRITER)
Date:  19910828

Text:
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08/28/91 H U.S. STRESSES COMPLIANCE WITH BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PACT SH(ACDA official notes upcoming review meeting) (990) BYBy Jacquelyn Porth BIUSIA Security Affairs Writer

TWashington -- While the United States strongly supports the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention to control the spread of these "particularly horrific types of weapons," an official of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says that ways to strengthen and improve the convention should be addressed at a review conference scheduled next month in Geneva.

Noting that representatives of signatory countries, as well as other observers will attend the conference to discuss issues of compliance and confidence building measures, Michael Moodie said in a recent interview with USIA that Iraq's apparent failure to comply with the convention even though it is a signatory nation focuses attention on "the need for continued vigilance."

Events in Iraq underline the importance for the entire international community "of getting a handle on the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction," including biological weapons, said Moodie, who is ACDA's assistant director for multilateral affairs.

The United States, Moodie said, maintains that "the best way to strengthen the convention is through (measures to promote) more transparency and openness."

"We provide a great deal of information publicly on our biological defense weapons," in terms of where and what kind of research is conducted and the amount of money devoted to it, Moodie pointed out.

Stressing that other nations, by making such data available, will give the international community greater confidence in the convention's objectives, he said, "We would like all states to achieve that same degree of openness."

Moodie noted that although confidence-building measures (CBMs) offer a way to promote openness and transparency, past participation in these measures "has not been as good as we would like it to be."

For example, he noted, only a few dozen nations have provided information in accordance with a 1986 CBM which calls for the exchange of data on defensive biological weapons research which is not prohibited by the convention. And only a few of those which have complied have reported annually, as required, Moodie said.

To strengthen the convention, he said, the United States would like to see "a more universal participation in that kind of information exchange."

Further, Moodie said, while some nations have stated verbally that they are not conducting any biological weapons related activities, it would be best if they put that statement in writing for the record in the form of "a null declaration."

Another CBM, which has seen little compliance, Moodie said, calls on states to report on unusual outbreaks of diseases. He said this may be attributed to absence of "a good reporting mechanism," and suggested that the World Health Organization (WHO) may help alleviate the problem.

Moodie also suggested that the September 9-30 review conference, which he described as "a very important step" in maintaining the convention as a major "bulwark against biological weapons proliferation," might work toward creating a "small administrative unit" to assist nations' compliance with CBMs.

The ACDA official expressed hope that at the conclusion of the conference a final document will be issued, reaffirming the commitment of the parties to the convention to meeting its objectives and increasing CBM participation.

More than 110 countries have signed the convention, agreeing not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire or retain biological agents or toxin weapons. The large number of signatories, Moodie said, "is a testament to the concern of the international community" about such weapons' proliferation. There are about 10 nations at present with active, offensive biological weapons production programs, he noted.

Speaking of Iraq's program August 28 at a briefing at the Foreign Press Center in Washington, Moodie pointed out that the Iraqis "were not totally honest with us" about the extent of their activity. The first in a series of United Nations biological weapons inspections in Iraq, he said, "raises more questions than it answers in terms...of the kinds of biological agents on which Iraq was working...(and) the plans for weaponization."

The preliminary inspections have found enough disturbing evidence "to warrant continued aggressive investigation," he stressed.

Moodie said that as part of its effort to strengthen the biological weapons convention, the United States will be encouraging states to use their own legal systems to criminalize the activities of individuals who promote offensive biological weapons programs. It is currently against the law for an American to engage in such an activity.

In addition, he noted, the United States has met with representatives of the pharmaceutical and biological research trade industry to discuss the industry's efforts to put together a coalition to exchange information on the convention and other biological weapons-related issues. The initial meetings have been encouraging, according to Moodie, and not at all adversarial.

The official said he is sure "everyone will bring a constructive and positive attitude toward the convention" to the three week review conference leading to "a renewed sense of commitment" to prevent biological proliferation.

He admitted, however, that the question of verifying the convention is potentially "the most contentious issue." Some states have been pressing the requirement for a verification protocol, something which does not currently exist.

The United States opposes a protocol because workable verification measures have yet to be identified since biological weapons research is so easy to hide. The problem is further complicated by the fact that biological weapons research and research into infectious diseases is very similar in nature. It is frequently difficult to distinguish legitimate academic and industrial research from that which is necessary to support offensive military programs.

The official cautioned against drawing conclusions about verification based upon the recent U.N. inspections in Iraq. He said there is a difference between willingly abiding by a verification regime and imposing harsh ceasefire requirements on a defeated aggressor.

Moodie said verification issues are important and there are some which "deserve further exploration." The United States, he said, would be "willing to have experts look at those issues without prejudging the outcome." He suggested that a panel of experts may be convened to study verification as an outgrowth of the upcoming conference. NNNN