U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8677

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties,"

Determined to make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, hereinafter referred to as "the multilateral convention,"

Aware of their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament,

Desiring to halt the production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of the preponderance of their chemical weapons stockpiles, without waiting for the mulitateral convention to enter into force,

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum,"

Recalling the bilateral commitment to cooperate with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, contained in the joint statement on chemical weapons issued at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, and mindful of the efforts of each Party aimed at the destrection of chemical weapons and desiring to cooperate in this area,

Have agreed as follows

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS AND AREAS OF COOPERATION

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

1. to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;

2. not to produce chemical weapons;

3. to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;

4. to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and

5. to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.

2. Each Party, during its destrtzction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

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  ARTICLE II

COOPERATION REGARDING METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DESTRUCTION

1. To implement their undertaking to cooperate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific program of cooperation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The program may include matters related to: methods and specific technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons; measures to ensure safety and protection of people and the environment; construction and operation of destruction facilities; the appropriate equipment for destruction, past, current and planned destruction activities; monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons; or such other topics as the Parties may agree. Activities to implement this program may include: exchanges of visits to relevant facilities; exchanges of documents; meetings and discussions among experts; or such other activities as the Parties may agree.

2. Each Party shall, as appropriate, cooperate with other states that request information or assistance regarding the destruction of chemical weapons. The Parties may respond jointly to such requests.

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  ARTICLE III

CESSATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, each Party shall not produce chemical weapons.

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  ARTICLE IV

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 5000 agent tons. In this Agreement, "tons" means metric tons.

2. Each Party shall begin its destruction of chemical weapons by no later than December 31, 1992.

3. By no later than December 31, 1999, each Party shall have destroyed at least 50 percent of its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons. The aggregate quantity of chemical weapons of a Party shall be the amount of chemical weapons declared in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or declared thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum, as updated in accordance with paragraph 6(b) of this Article.

4. In the event that a Party determines that it cannot achieve an annual rate of destruction of chemical weapons of at least 1000 agent tons during 1995, or that it cannot destroy at least 1000 agent tons during each year after 1995, that Party shall, at the earliest possible time, notify the other Party, in accordance with Paragraph 10 of this Article.

5. Each Party, in its destruction of chemical weapons, shall also destroy the munitions, devices and containers from which the chemicals have been removed. Each Party shall reduce and limit its other empty munitions and devices for chemical weapons purposes so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the aggregate capacity of such munitions and devices does not exceed the volume of the remaining bulk agent of that Party.

6. Thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall inform the other Party of the following:

1. its current general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement and its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force. The detailed plan shall encompass all of the chemical weapons to be destroyed during the calendar year, and shall include their locations, types and quantities, the methods of their destruction, and the locations of the destruction facilities that are to be used; and

2. any changes, as of the entry into force of this Agreement, in the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum.

7. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than November 30, of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the following calendar year.

8. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than April 15, of the following:

1. any further changes, as of December 31 of the previous year, to the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum;

2. the implementation during the previous calendar year of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons; and

3. any update to the general and detailed plans provided pursuant to paragraphs 6(a) or 7 of this Article.

9. Each Party shall limit its chemical weapons storage facilities so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the number of such facilities does not exceed eight. Each Party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations, including those under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

10. If a Party experiences problems that will prevent it from destroying its chemical weapons at a rate sufficient to meet the levels specified in this Article, that Party shall immediately notfly the other Party and provide a ful explanation. The Parties shall promptly consult on measures necessary to resolve the problems. Under no circumstances shall the Party not experiencing problems in its destruction of chemical weapons be required to destroy its chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than the Party that has experienced such problems.

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  ARTICLE V

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas within these destruction facilities for systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct, promptly after its receipt of the notification, an onsite inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are present at that facility. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year of the notification and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility for which it has received a notification pursuant to this paragraph, to determine that chemical weapons are not being stored there.

4. When a Party has completed its destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement, it shall promptly notify the other Party. In its notification, the Party shall specify the chemical weapons storage facilities where its remaining chemical weapons are located and provide a detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each of these storage facilities. Each Party, promptly after it has received such a notification, shall have the right to inspect each of the chemical weapons storage facilities specified in the notification, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons at each facility.

5. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year in which destruction begins and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility of the other Party that is not already subject to annual inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons that are being stored there.

6. On the basis of the reports of its inspectors and ocher information available to it, each Party shall determine whether the provisions of this Agreement are being satisfactorily fulfilled and shall communicate its conclusions to the other Party.

7. Detailed provisions for the implementation of the inspection measures provided for in this Article shall be set forth in the document on inspection procedures. The Parties shall work to complete this document by December 31, 1990.

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  ARTICLE VI

MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

The Parties shall cooperate in making every effort to conclude the multilateral convention at the earliest date and to implement it effectively. Toward those ends, the Parties agree, in addition to their other obligations in this Agreement, to the following:

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than the end of the eighth year after entry into force of the multilateral convention, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 500 agent tons.

2. Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years.

3. The Parties shall intensify their cooperation with each other and with other states to ensure that all chemical weapons-capable states become parties to the multilateral convention.

4. The Parties declare their intention to be among the original parties to the multilateral convention.

5. To gain experience and thereby facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the multilateral convention, the Parties agree to conduct bilateral verification experiments involving trial challenge inspections at facilities not declared under the Memorandum or subsequently. The detailed modalities for such experiments, including the number and location of the facilities to be inspected, as well as the procedures to be used, shall be agreed between the Parties no later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.

  ARTICLE VII

CONSULTATIONS

The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as they may agree.

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  ARTICLE VIII

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCUMENTS

1. After the multilateral convention enters into force, the provisions of the multilateral convention shall take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement in cases of incompatible obligations therein. Otherwise, the provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the provisions of the multilateral convention in its operation between the Parties. After the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to this Agreement shall consult with each other in order to resolve any questions concerning the relationship of this Agreement to the multilateral convention.

2. The chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, and chemical weapons production facilities subject to this Agreement are those that are subject to declaration under the Memorandum.

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ARTICLE IX

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Agreement

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  ARTICLE X

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; WITHDRAWAL

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each Party.

2. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration, unless the Parties agree to terminate it after the entry into force of the multilateral convention.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this 1st day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Paragraph 2 of Artide VI of the Agreement stipulates that, "Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years."

In this connection, the Parties agree that an affirmative decision would require the agreement of a majority of the states parties that attend the special conference, with such majority including those states parties attending the special conference that had taken the following three steps:

1. presented officially and publicly, before December 31, 1991, before the Conference on Disarmament, a written dedaration that they were at the time of that declaration in possession of chemical weapons;

2. signed the multilateral convention within thirty days after it was opened for signature; and

3. became a party to the multilateral convention by no later than one year after its entry into force.

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  ANNEX VI

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE RELATED TO PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Determined to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,

Convinced that increased openness about their chemical weapons capabilities is essential for building the confidence necessary for early completion of the convention,

Desiring also to gain experience in the procedures and measures for verification of the convention,

Have agreed as follows:

I. General Provisions

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall conduct a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The bilateral verification erpenrnent and data exchange shall be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall exchange general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the two sides shall exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspection to verify the accuracy of those data.

3. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohobition and destruction of chemical weapons by:

1. enabling each side to gain confidence in the data on chemical weapons capabilities that will be provided under the provisions of the convention;
   
2. enabling each side to gain confidence in the inspection procedures that will be used to verify compliance with the convention; and
   
3. facilitating the elaboration of the provisions of the convention.

5. Data shall be current as of the date of the exchange, and shall encompass all sites and facilities specified below, wherever they are located.

6. Each side shall take appropriate steps to protect the confidentialitv of the data it receives. Each side undertakes not to divulge this data without the explicit consent of the side that provided the data.

II. Phase I

In Phase I, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

1. the aggegate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons;

2. the specific types of chemicals it possesses that are defined as chemical weapons, indicating the common name of each chemical;

3. the percentage of each of its declared chemicals that is stored in munitions and devices, and the percentage that is stored in storage containers;

4. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

5. for each of its declared chemical weapons storage facilities:

-- the common name of each chemical defined as a chemical weapon that is stored there;

-- the percentage of the precise aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons that is stored there;

and

-- the specific types of munitions and devices that are stored there;

6. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons production facilities, indicating the common name of each chemical that has been or is being produced at each facility; and

7. the precise location of each of its facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, including those currently existing, under construction, or planned.

In Phase I, each side shall permit the other side to visit some of its chemical weapons storage and production facilities, the exact number of which will be agreed upon as soon as possible. In addition, each side shall permit the other side to visit two industrial chemical production facilities. Each side will select the facilities to be visited by the other side.

III. Phase II

In Phase II, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilies:

1. the chemical name of each chemical it possesses that is defined as a chemical weapon;

2. the detailed inventory, including the quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of its

chemical weapons storage facilities;

3. its preliminary general plans for destruction of chemical weapons under the convention, including the characteristics of the facilities it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

4. the capacity of each of its chemical weapons production facilities;

5. preliminary general plans for closing and destroying each of its chemical weapons production facilities under the convention, including the methods it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

6. the precise location and capacity of its planned single small-scale facility allowed under the convention for the production, for non-prohibited purposes under strict safeguards, of a limited quantity of chemicals that pose a high risk, i.e., Schedule 1 chemicals;

7. the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility, or establishment designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

IV. Timing

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data shall be exchanged not later than 31 December 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 30 June 1990, provided that the sides have agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the number of visits, as well as on the programs and other detailed arrangements for the visits, and assuming that the sides have agreed by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility to be visited by each side in its first visit to the other side.

2. In Phase I each side may withhold temporarily, for reasons of security, data on the locations of storage facilities that together contain a total quantity of chemical weapons that is more than two percent of the precise quantity of its chemicaI weapons. In addition, the other data pertaining to these locations, as specified in Section II, paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the heading "other storage locations" without reference to specific locations. Precise data pertaining to these locations shall be exchanged later in Phase I on a subsequent date to be agreed.

3. Phase II data shall be exchanged on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text of the convention. At that time, both sides shall formaIIy and jointly acknowledge the possibility of initialing the convention within four months.

V. Verification

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data.

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold consultations to discuss the information that has been presented and visits that have been exchanged. The sides will cooperate in clarifying ambiguous situations.

3. During Phase Il, each side shall have the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase II data by means of on-site inspections. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapons capabilities of the sides.

4. Prior to the initialing of the conven tion, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities and chemical weapons production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side of their number is more than 10. Should either side as of the date of the Phase II exchange possess a single small-scale facility for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it shall be subject to an additional inspection.

Each side shall also have the opportunity to carry out up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. All inspections shall be carried out within the agreed four months from the date of the declaration pertaining to Phase II, referred in Section IV.

5. While the signed convention is being considered by their respective legislative bodies, each side shall have the opponunity to request from the other side, and to obtain from it, updated data. Each side shall have the opportunity to conduct up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. During this process, the two sides will consult with their respective legislative bodies, as appropriate, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

For each side, these inspections shall be carried out within a four-month period, beginning with the date that it conducts its first inspection. The sides shall consult and agree on the dates when the first inspection will be conducted by each side. The dates shall be chosen to ensure that the inspections shall be conducted by both sides at approximately the same time. Once the inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual consent, extend the four-month periods for an additional specified period.

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections, shall be conducted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the draft convention, taking into account that these inspections are being carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve the bodies that will be established under the convention. If necessary, the two sides shall supplement the provisions of the draft convention by mutually-agreed procedures.

7. Challenge inspections may be made at any location or facility of the other side, as provided for in the draft convention text, except that, for the purposes of this Memorandum and without creating a precedent, challenge inspections at facilities not on the territory of the sides may be made only at military facilities of a side in a limited number of countries; the sides will agree later on these specific countries.

8. Challenge inspections conducted pursuant to this Memorandum shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the domestic law of the side being inspected and shall be based on a recognition by both sides of the need to resolve concerns and build confidence.

9. To clarify. questions related to the data provided during Phase I and Phase II, the two

sides shall employ normal diplomatic channels specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as may be agreed upon.

VI. Format

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided, according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

2. Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and significant geographical relief features in the vicinitv of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the diagram shall clearly specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic coordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

VII. Entry into Force

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
James A. Baker III

Source: Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue No. 6. November 1989.


CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY

September 1993


CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY
An Information Paper Published by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

No. 1, September 1993


US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION (202) 647-8677


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This information paper is the first of a series intended to inform corporate executives and other interested parties about the impact on U.S. industry of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons.

Current Status

The CWC, which was opened for signature in January 1993, could enter into force six months after 65 signatories have formally ratified it, but no earlier than January 13, 1995. To date, 148 countries have signed the treaty and 4 have ratified. The Clinton Administration plans to submit the CWC to the U.S. Senate this fail for its consent to ratification, which requires a two-thirds majority vote. Both the Senate and the House will also need to pass, by simple majorities, domestic implementing legislation to make the treaty provisions binding on U.S. citizens and businesses. A U.S. National Authority to oversee the domestic implementation of the treaty is also being organized.

Treaty-Controlled Chemicals

Chemicals subject to verification and trade restrictions under the CWC have been placed on three "Schedules," based on the threat they pose to the purpose and objectives of the treaty and the extent of their commercial use. Verification measures are most stringent for Schedule 1 chemicals (known chemical-warfare agents and final-stage precursors with few if any commercial uses), less stringent for Schedule 2 chemicals (potential warfare agents and precursors used in moderate quantities for commercial purposes), and least stringent for Schedule 3 chemicals (toxic chemicals and precursors used in large quantities for commercial purposes).

Affected Facilities

Facilities that produce more than specified threshold quantities of Schedule 1 and 3 chemicals, or that produce, process, or consume more than threshold quantities of Schedule 2 chemicals, are required to file initial dedarations and annual reports on their activities. These facilities will also be subject to on-site inspections by international inspectors.

CWC reporting obligations also apply to other relevant chemical plants that have the potential to produce scheduled chemicals but do not currently do so. Such plants must file dedarations and annual reports if they produce more than 200 metric tons per year of any "discrete organic chemical" not listed in the Schedules, or 30 tons of any "PSF" chemical, defined as an organic chemical containing phosphorus (P), sulfur (S), or fluorine (F), which are often present in chemical-warfare agents.

Inspection Requirements

International inspection teams will carry out routine on-site inspections of declared faclities to verify the accuracy of the submitted data. Depending on the nature of a given plant, it may receive up to two routine inspections per year. Moreover, any facility-government-owned or private, dedared or undedared-will be subject to a more intrusive "challenge" inspection by an international inspection team at the request of another State Party that suspects the facility's activities are violating the treaty.

Confidential business information (CBI) unrelated to chemical weapons will be safeguarded through a number of means, induding: (1) inspection procedures outlined in the treaty; (2) the negotiation for certain types of plants of "facility agreements" that spedfy inspector access, (3) the right of facilities to "manage access" by shrouding sensitive equipment and other means; and (4) spedal procedures for the dassification and handling of CBI, to be established by the international treaty organization.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
   
2. Background
   
3. Verification Challenges
   
4. Treaty-Controlled Chemicals and Facilities
   
5. Treaty Obligations on Industry
   
6. Tunetable for CWC Implementation
   
7. Implementing Organizations
   
8. Role of the Chemical Industry
   
9. Questions and Answers on Industry Compliance
   

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II. Background

Ever since toxic chemicals were introduced onto the bafflefield during World War I, they have been considered a particularly indiscriminate and abhorrent form of warfare. Although well-equipped troops can be protected against chemical weapons with gas masks, protective garments, and antidotes such as atropine, chemical-warfare (CW) agents can be devastating when used against unprotected troops or civilians.

The first CW agents were "choking" gases such as chlorine and phosgene, which damage the eyes and lungs, and "blood" agents such as hydrogen cyanide, which poisons the oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood and causes death by asphyxiation. These toxic gases were followed by liquid "blister" agents such as sulfur mustard and lewisite, which cause painful skin burns, blindness, and lung damage, and also suppress the immune system, rendering victims susceptible to severe infections. During World War I, chemical weapons killed nearly 100,000 soldiers and injured 1.2 million more.

The physical and psychological effects of gas warfare were so horrifying that during the interwar period, countries negotiated the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in war. Despite the ban on use, however, the major powers continued to develop, produce, and stockpile new poisonous agents, as these activities were not prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Indeed, the most deadly chemical weapons--"nerve" agents such as tabun, sarin, soman, and VX--were developed before, during, and after World War II. These chemicals kill by interfering with nerve transmission; a pinhead-sized droplet of VX, absorbed through the skin, is sufficient to cause convulsions, loss of muscular control, and death by respiratory paralysis.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated vast quantifies of chemical weapons, raising the spectre of their large-scale use in a central European conflict. This threat, combined with the growing proliferation of chemical weapons in the developing world, prompted the Conference on Disarmament to begin work in the early 1970s on a treaty banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use of incapacitating and lethal chemicals as a method of warfare. Although the talks moved at a glacial pace for several years, the large-scale use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s generated renewed political impetus for a global ban.

By early 1992, the negotiators in Geneva realized that they had a limited window of opportunity to bring the treaty to completion before international interest and political will were lost. After a final push to resolve the most contentious issues (such as procedures for challenge inspections), the negotiations were concluded successfully in September 1992, and the treaty was opened for signature in mid-January 1993.

The CWC is a true disarmament treaty. All States Parties are required to destroy their existing stockpiles of chemical weapons (if any) within 10 years of the treaty's entry into force, with a possible extension of up to 5 years in exceptional cases. The CWC also regulates the production, processing, and consumption of chemicals that are themselves chemical-warfare agents or can be converted into or used to produce CW agents. Most of the latter chemicals are "dual-use," meaning that they also have legitimate commercial applications. The CWC is "nondiscriminatory," meaning that all States Parties, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, are subject to the same reporting and inspection obligations.

While universal adherence to the CWC and the complete abolition of chemical weapons will not be achieved immediately, the treaty will put in place an international legal framework that outlaws both the possession and use of chemical weapons. The CWC also contains incentives for countries to join the regime. First, it restricts the export of certain treaty-controlled chemicals to non-Parties. Second, the CWC encourages assistance to States Parties that are victims of the use or threatened use of chemical weapons.

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III. Verification Challenges

Verifying that all parties to the CWC are in compliance with its provisions will be essential to maintaining confidence in the treaty regime. To this end, the CWC calls for the routine monitoring of all dedared "dual-use" industrial-chemicals and production facilities, while seeking to mmm'uze the resulting burdens on legitimate commercial activities.

There are three major challenges facing CWC verification. First, nearly all the chemicals used to make CW agents have legitimate commercial uses in the manufacture of products such as pestiddes, pharmaceuticals, plastics, inks, and paints. For example, although thiodiglycol can be converted to mustard gas in a single reaction step, it is also used in photographic developing solutions, electroplating, printing, and as a solvent to keep the ink in ballpoint pens flowing. Similarly, phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, which were employed as chemical weapons in World War I, are consumed in the millions of tons each year for industrial purposes.

A second verification challenge is that chemical weapons can be made with commercial equipment generally available to any country.

A third verification challenge is that a chemical-weapons production fadlity is generally indistinguishable in external appearance from an ordinary chemical plant.

For all these reasons, the verification provisions of the CWC call for intrusive on-site inspections of government-owned and private facilities that work with treaty-controlled chemicals. Indeed, the ability to inspect any one of thousands of chemical plants worldwide will be essential to have any chance of detecting--and thus deterring--violations of the CWC.

Negotiators labored for years to craft a verification regime that is stringent enough to deter violations and build confidence in the Convention, without imposing undue burdens on legitimate industry or jeopardizing national-security and trade secrets unrelated to the treaty regime. A balance between these objectives was crafted with the aid of representatives of the world chemical industry.

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IV. Treaty-Controlled Chemicals and Facilities

The CWC's Annex on Chemicals lists treaty-controlled chemicals on three "Schedules" according to the threat they pose to the objectives and purpose of the Convention. In making this assessment, the following factors have been taken into account:. (1) the toxicity and physical properties that make a chemical agent suitable for military use; (2) the extent to which a chemical has been developed or used for military purposes in the past; and (3) its volume of production for legitimate industrial or commercial applications. Each Seheduie is associated with a distinct set of verification measures, with those for Schedule 1 the most stringent and those for Schedule 3 the least.

Schedule 1 covers known CW agents and the final-stage precursors, some of which are used in "binary" chemical weapons in which two final ingredients of nerve agents are mixed together either immediately before use or automatically while the munition is in flight to the target. Only a few U.S. companies currently make Schedule 1 chemicals for commercial purposes, such as pharmaceutical firms that produce nitrogen mustards or ricin immunotoxins for cancer chemotherapy. There is an aggregate yearly limit of 1 metric ton on the production of these chemicals by a State Party for defensive or peaceful purposes, with subthresholds within this aggregate limit. Maximum yearly production for medical, pharmaceutical, or research purposes is limited to 10 kilograms per facility. Facilities that produce more than 100 grams per year must file declarations and annual reports and are subject to routine on-site inspection.

Schedule 2 covers toxic chemicals that might be employed as CW agents, as well as certain precursor chemicals (e.g., thiodiglycol) used commerdally in limited quantities. Schedule 2 facilities must file initial declarations and annual reports if they produce, process, or consume more than the threshold quantities of these chemicals--1 kg, 100 kg, or 1 metric ton annually, depending on subclass. Such facilities are also subject to routine inspection if they produce, process, or consume more than 10 kg, 1 metric ton, or 10 metric tons of Schedule 2 chemicals, depending on subclass.

Schedule 3 covers toxic chemicals and precursors that are used industrially in large quantities. Facilities that produce more than 30 metric tons per year of these chemicals must ffie dedarations and annual reports; those that produce more than 200 metric tons per year are subject to routine inspection.

The CWC also covers other relevant chemical production facilities that do not now produce scheduled chemicals but could potentially be used for this purpose. Facilities induded in this category are chemical plants that produce more than 200 metric tons of any "discrete organic chemical," or more than 30 metric tons of any "PSF" chemical, defined as an organic compound containing phosphorus (P), sulfur (S), or fluorine (F), which are often present in CW agents. Only those facilities that produce pure hydrocarbons or explosives are exempted from the dedaration requirement.

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V. Treaty Obligations on Industry

After the CWC enters into force, each State Party must submit to the international treaty organization within 30 days an initial declaration detailing its industrial production, processing, and consumption of treaty-controlled chemicals over the previous three years. To allow sufficient time for the U.S. Government to compile this dedaration, industry may be required to submit such data to the Government some months in advance of the treaty's entry into force.

It is also expected that affected companies will have to file two annual reports updating their initial declarations. A prospective report giving estimates of anticipated production and use of treaty-controlled chemicals over the coming year will be due 60 days before the end of each calendar year, and a retrospective report on the past year's activities will be due 90 days after the end of each calendar year.

International teams of inspectors may perform up to two on-site inspections per year of any declared facility to verify the accuracy of the submitted data. Routine inspections of commercial chemical plants are designed to detect--and thereby deter--activities that violate the letter and spirit of the Convention. To this end, routine inspections will attempt to verify that the plant is not being diverted for the manufacture of Schedule 1 agents (either on-site or off-site) and that the quantities of treaty-controlled "dual-use" chemicals being produced, processed, or consumed are consistent with the dedarations.

During the first three years after the CWC enters into force, commercial facilities that produce, process, or consume Schedule 2 chemicals may expect an initial inspection, which will determine the subsequent frequency of routine inspections. The timing of the initial inspections will depend on an assessment of the potential threat posed by each Schedule 2 facility to the objectives and purpose of the Convention. At the time of the initial inspection, U.S. officials and the CWC inspection tearn--with the involvement of managers from the inspected plant--will negotiate a facility agreement. This document will specify which parts of the site are subject to murine inspection, where samples can be taken, and so forth. Negotiation of a facility agreement is mandatory for all Schedule 2 facilities unless the State Party and the inspection team agree to waive it as unnecessary.

Schedule 3 facilities are also subject to routine inspections after entry into force. An initial inspection and negotiation of a facility agreement are not required for Schedule 3 sites, although they may be arranged on a voluntary basis.

Whereas facilities that produce Schedule 1 chemicals may be subject to an unlimited number of inspections, Schedule 2 or 3 facilities may each receive at most two on-site inspections per year. There is also a yearly maximum of 20 inspections per country of Schedule 3 and other relevant production facilities combined. The maximum duration of a routine inspection is variable for a Schedule 1 facility depending on risk, 96 hours for a Schedule 2 facility, and 24 hours for a Schedule 3 or other relevant facility.

In addition to routine inspections, a State Party can request a challenge inspection at any government-owned or private facility, declared or undeclared, that is suspected of activities prohibited by the CWC. The Geneva negotiators hammered out a set of procedures for challenge inspections that balances the intrusiveness required to resolve CWC compliance concerns against the need to safeguard legitimate national-security and trade secrets unrelated to chemical weapons.

Challenge inspections will be carried out according to a complex timetable. The State Party to be inspected receives 12 hours notice before the inspection team arrives at a point of entry (POE) such as an international airport. For challenge inspections of undeclared sites, the inspection team must be transported to the site perimeter within 36 hours after their arrival at the POE. Negotiations between the inspection team and the host country over the intrusiveness of the inspection may then continue for a maximum of 72 hours. Access inside the site perimeter must be granted within 120 hours (5 days) after a challenge is announced. The duration of a challenge inspection may not exceed 84 hours, unless extended by mutual agreement of the inspection team and the host country.

For challenge inspections of declared sites (e.g., declared industry), the timeline is considerably shorter. The inspection team must be transported to the site perimeter no later than 24 hours after their arrival at the POE. Once at the site, they must then be given access after the facility briefing, which is limited to 3 hours.

Because of the political cost of requesting a challenge inspection, which is tantamount to accusing another country of noncompliance, requests by the U.S. Government will be made only if there is strong evidence of a treaty violation at a particular site.

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VI. Timetable for CWC Implementation

US. Ratification. The Administration plans to submit the CWC to the U.S. Senate this fall for its advice and consent to ratification, which requires a two-thirds majority vote. Passage of domestic implementing legislation is also necessary to make the provisions of the CWC binding on American citizens and businesses, to impose penalties for violations, and to ensure that treaty implementation respects Constitutional rights such as protection from "unreasonable searches and soilares." A draft of the implementing legislation will be submitted to the Congress and must be approved by a simple majority of both the Senate and the House.

Entry into Force. Entry into force of the CWC can occur 180 days after the 65th country ratifies the Convention and deposits its ratification with the United Nations, but no sooner than 2 years after the treaty was opened for signature, to allow time for the States Parties and industry to prepare for implementation. To date, 148 countries have signed the treaty and 4 have ratified. Most signatory countries are working on the assumption that the CWC will enter into force on the earliest possible date, which would be mid-January 1995.

Initial Declaration. The United States must submit its initial dedaration to the international treaty organization not later than 30 days after the treaty enters into force. In order to meet this deadline, the U.S. Government will need sufficient time to compile the individual industry dedarations into a national declaration. For this reason, the filing deadline for industry may be some months in advance of the national deadline; it will be specified in regulations adopted pursuant to the U.S. domestic implementing legislation.

Inspections. During the first three years after entry into force, initial and routine inspections of Schedule 2 and 3 facilities will be carried out. Inspections of "other" relevant chemical facilities may also begin after four years. At any time after entry into force, however, more intrusive "challenge" inspection may be requested by a State Party against any facility or location, public or private, suspected of violating the CWC.

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VII. Implementing Organizations

Compliance with the CWC will be monitored by a new international agency called the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), based in The Hague, Netherlands. The OPCW will consist of three entities:

The Conference of the States Parties, made up of countries that have joined the treaty regime, will be the major decision-making body.

The Executive Council has 41 rotating members selected from various geographical areas, taking account of the size of each country's chemical industry. The Council will oversee the day-to-day operation of the organization.

The Technical Secretariat, staffed with international dvil servants drawn from States Parties, will monitor compliance with the treaty. Its duties will include the analysis of declarations and annual reports submitted by States Parties and the conduct of on-site inspections.

Detailed procedures for the implementation of the CWC are being worked out during the two-year period before the treaty enters into force by a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) currently meeting in The Hague. The PrepCom is addressing a wide range of detailed issues involved in CWC implementation, such as the equipment and procedures for on-site inspections, and is also building the organizational structure of the future OPCW. All countries that are initial signatories to the CWC are entitled to participate in the work of the PrepCom, although only about 20 countries have so far been actively involved.

Much of the actual negotiating and drafting of irnplementation policy papers is done by Experts Groups, which report to Working Groups with a broader mandate. Policy papers prepared by the Experts Groups and approved by the Working Groups are then considered and ratified by official state representatives at week-long Plenary sessions, which are convened every 2-3 months. The fourth Plenary Session is scheduled for September 27 to October 1, 1993, and the fifth on December 13-17.

The predecessor of the future OPCW Technical Secretariat, known as the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS), has already been established in The Hague to support the PrepCom and to manage the transition to the functioning international organization. Executive Secretary of the PTS is lan Kenyon, a British diplomat with a background in the chemical industry, who oversees a staff of about 60 international civil servants.

When the CWC enters into force six months after the 65th ratification, the PTS will be replaced by the Technical Secretariat. During the transition period, the size of the international staff will expand rapidly as hundreds of inspectors are hired.

The CWC requires that each State Party establish a National Authority through domestic implementing legislation. The U.S. National Authority is currently being organized. It will ensure that all treaty-mandated declarations and inspections are carried out and provide policy guidance during OPCW inspections of U.S. facilities. In addition, an Office of the National Authority (ONA) will be established to compile required dedarations and reports, liaise with the OPCW, and provide administrative support for implementation activities by U.S. Government departments and agencies.

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VIII. Role of the Chemical Industry

The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), a leading U.S. chemical industry trade association, endorsed the CWC negotiations for nearly 14 years while seeking to shape the treaty regime so as to minimize its adverse effects on industry. The Association's executives reasoned that because of the public's abhorrence of chemical weapons, it was in the chemical industry's own interest to support their elimination.

In 1986, the CMA established a Chemical Weapons Work Group that has since convened on a regular basis and exchanged views with U.S. Government offidals. During the CWC negotiations, the CMA joined other chemical trade associations from Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan in an international industry forum that met occasionally with the negotiators in Geneva. Many of this group's recommendations are reflected in the final treaty text, most notably in the sections on routine and challenge inspections and in the annex covering the protection of confidential business information (CBI).

Until recently, other U.S. chemical trade associations were less active in monitoring the CWC negotiations and largely relied on the CMA to look out for their interests. As the Convention approaches the date of entry into force, however, additional sectors of the industry are becoming concerned about how the treaty will affect them. Other interested trade associations include the National Agricultural Chemicals Association (NACA), the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association (SOCMA), and groups representing downstream processors and consumers of treaty-controlled chemicals.

The PrepCom work of greatest interest for the U.S. chemical industry takes place in three Experts Groups, those on Industrial Facilities, Equipment, and Challenge Inspections. These groups meet periodically to develop dedaration formats, guidelines for inspection procedures, criteria for determining the number and duration of inspections, and types of inspection equipment.

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IX. Questions and Answers on Industry Compliance

Q. Why are we hearing about the CWC now if it will not enter into force until 1995?

A. Government planners considered it prudent to inform U.S. industry of its treaty obligations soon after the CWC was signed and its requirements became more certain, for a number of reasons. First, it will take considerable time to identify and contact the large number of U.S. companies with reporting and/or inspection obligations under the treaty. Second, discussions on detailed treaty procedures will be conducted at the PrepCom for the next year and a half, and the U.S. Government continues to welcome industry views. The government may also request the voluntary participation of companies to help develop and test declaration forms for data collection and to host National Trial Inspections. Finally, companies affected by the treaty should use the
period before entry into force to plan for possible inspections and to collect the data necessary to meet CWC dedaration requirements.

Q. What happens if I do not make the required declarations?

A. The CWC requires States Parties to implement domestic legislation purushing individuals and businesses that fail to comply with the treaty. Such penalties--administrative, civil, criminal, or some combination thereof--will be spelled out in the implementing legislation and subsequent regulations.

Q. What happens if I refuse to allow CWC inspectors into my plant?

A. Denying inspectors entry to a commercial facility would breach the obligations of the United States as a party to the CWC, putting it in a position of non-compliance. For this reason, the U.S. Government encourages industry's cooperation with treaty inspections. The implementing legislation and subsequent regulations will establish procedures for securing admittance to a plant. CWC routine inspections, particularly the initial ones, are likely to be of media interest, and refusal to admit inspectors would generate adverse publicity.

Q: How can industry safeguard confidential business information (CBI) during CWC
inspections?

A: The CWC includes provisions that enable industry to protect CBI unrelated to chemical weapons. First, the treaty limits the aims of an inspection to verifying treaty compliance and allows inspected fadlities to control access for reasons of safety, security, or confidentiality. To this end, companies can negotiate a facility agreement specifying in advance the areas of a facility subject to inspection, the plant records that may be reviewed, points where samples can be taken, and so forth. Second, companies can "manage access" during challenge inspections through such measures as shrouding or covering control panels and other sensitive equipment. Finally, information identified as CBI to the OPCW Technical Secretariat will be subject to strict dassification and handling procedures.

Q. What support is the inspected facility obligated to give to the inspection team?

A. The inspected facility is expected to provide a plant briefing for the inspection team and to facilitate the inspection. The U.S. Government must also provide or arrange for means of communications, interpreters, transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care, and the inspected site may be asked to provide some of these services.

Q. What will the U.S. Government do to assist private industry in meeting CWC obligations?

A. The Federal Government is engaged in various outreach activities to educate industry about its CWC obligations, induding seminars and publications. In the spring of 1994, the U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA) plans to hold a second set of CWC seminars for industry in cities around the country. The government will also provide guidelines on reporting and how to prepare for and comply with on-site inspections. Other assistance may be specified in the implementing legislation.

Q. Who will pay the costs associated with preparing declarations and hosting inspections at private industrial sites?

A. Such costs are assumed to be the responsibility of the private firms involved.

Q. What remedies are available to compensate industry for the loss or compromise of
confidential business information (CBI)?

A. Remedies will depend on the nature of the situation. The U.S. Government may assume liability if it is determined that the loss was a direct result of the government's action in opening the facility for inspection. Alternatively, the Director-General of the OPCW is authorized to establish a commission to investigate international breaches of confidentiality on a case-by-case basis.

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SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their precursors. For the purpose of implementing the CWC, these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of verification measures according to the provisions of the Verification Annex. Pursuant to Artide II, subparagraph 1 (a), these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical weapons.

(Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly exempted. A chemical marked "*" on Schedule 2, part A, is subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, as specified in Part Vll of the Verification Annex.)

Schedule 1 (CAS Registry Number)


A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) O-Alkyl (<= C 10 incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr ) -phosphonofluoridates

e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphono- (107-44-8)
fluoridate
Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphono- (96-64-0)
fluoridate

(2) O-Alkyl (<=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphorarnidocyanidates

e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl (77-81-6)
phosphoramidocyanidate

(3) O-Alkyl (H or <=C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and
corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl (50782-69-9)
methyl phosphonothiolate

(4) Sulfur mustards:

2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide (2625-76-5)
Mustard gas: Bis (2-chloroethyl) sulfide (505-60-2)
Bis (2-chloroethylthio) methane (63869-13-6)
Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis (2-chloroethylthio) ethane (3563-36-8)
1,3-Bis (2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane (63905-10-2)
1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane (142868-93-7)
l,S-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane (142868-94-8)
Bis (2-chloroethylthiomethyl) ether (63918-90-1)
O-Mustard: Bis (2-chloroethylthioethyl) ether (63918-89-8)

(5) Lewisites:

Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine (541-25-3)
Lewisite 2: Bis (2-ch1orovinyl) chloroarsine (40334-69-8)
Lewisite 3: Tris (2-chlorovinyl) arsine (40334-70-1)

(6) Nitrogen mustards:

HNl: Bis (2-chloroethyl) ethylamine (538-07-8)
HN2: Bis (2-chloroethyl) methylamine (51-75-2)
HN3: Tris (2-chloroethyl) amine (555-77-1)

(7) Saxitoxin (35523-89-8)

(8) Ricin (9009-86-3)

B. Precursors:

(9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldffluorides

e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride (676-99-3)

(10) O-Alkyl (H or <=10, incl. cyclalkyl) O-2-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, N-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites
and corresponding alkylated or protonated salts

e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylammoethyl methylphosphonite (57856-11-8)

(11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl methylphosphono-
chloridate (1445-76-7)

(12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphono-
chloridate (7040-57-5)

Schedule 2

A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino) ethyl]
phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated
or protonated salts (78-53-5)

(2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-
l-propene (382-21-8)

(3) BZ: 3-Quinudidinyl benzilate (*) (6581-06-2)

B. Precursors:

(4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 1,
containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one
methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group but not
further carbon atoms

e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride (676-97-1)
Dimethyl methylphosphonate (756-79-6)

Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl
ethylphosphonothiolothionate (944-22-9)

(5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic
dihalides

(6) Dialkyl (Me, F-t, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates

(7) Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1)

(8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (76-93-7)

(9) Quinudidine-3-ol (1619-34-7)

(10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-
chlorides and corresponding protonated salts

(11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ols
and corresponding protonated salts

Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol (108-01-0)
and corresponding protonated salts
N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding (100-37-8)
protonated salts

(12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-
2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts

(13) Thiodiglycol: Bis (2-hydroxethyl) sulfide (111-48-8)

(14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol (464-07-3)

Schedule

A. Toxic chemicals:

(1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride (75-44-5)

(2) Cyanogen chloride (506-77-4)

(3) Hydrogen cyanide (74-90-8)

(4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane (76-06-2)

B. Precursors:

(5) Phosphorus oxychloride (10025-87-3)
(6) Phosphorus trichloride (7719-12-2)
(7) Phosphorus pentachloride (10026-13-8)
(8) Trimethyl phosphite (121-45-9)
(9) Triethyl phosphite (122-52-1)
(10) Dimethyl phosphite (868-85-9)
(11) Diethyl phosphite (762-04-9)
(12) Sulfur monochloride (10025-67-9)
(13) Sulfur dichloride (10545-99-0)
(14) Thionyl chloride (7719-09-7)
(15) Ethyldiethanolamine (139-87-7)
(16) Methyldiethanolamine (105-59-9)
(17) Triethanolamine 9102-71-6)





CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY

November 1993

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY
An Information Paper Published by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
No. 2, November 1993

This information paper, the second in a series on the relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and U.S. industry, discusses the lessons learned to date from National Trial Inspections (NTIs) performed at commercial facilities to test and evaluate the verification provisions of the treaty.

The CWC requires on-site inspections of chemical plants that produce--and in some cases, process or consume--more than specified quantities of chemicals listed in an annex to the treaty. Such inspections may illdude visual examination of plant equipment, auditing of production records, and chemical sampling and analysis. NTIs of commercial facilities have clarified issues relating to the verification regime, and have been invaluable learning experiences for both government and industry participants.

This paper describes some important lessons learned from past NTIs. It also suggests how companies can use NTl-like exercises to prepare for real inspections and to develop procedures for safeguarding trade secrets and other confidential business information unrelated to the CWC.

How Industry Can Participate

Additional NTIs will be particularly valuable during the period immediately preceding the treaty's entry into force. Officials of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are prepared to meet with industry representatives to sketch out the planning process involved in conducting NTIs and mock inspections, exercises narrower in scope than NTIs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction
   
2. Benefits of National Trial Inspections
   
3. Auditing of Plant Records
   
4. Sampling and Analysis
   
5. Safeguarding Confidential Business Information
   
6. Managed-Access Techniques
   
7. Costs of Trial Inspections
   
8. Need for Additional NTIs
   
9. For More Information
   

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II. Benefits of Trial Inspections

Trial inspections can run the gamut from simple table-top simulations to full-scale exercises. Although their primary purpose is to test and evaluate the relevant verification provisions of the CWC, they also provide practical training for CWC inspectors and the personnel of the inspected plant. In general, the greater the realism of the trial inspection and the less the amount of simulation, the more can be learned from the experience.

Trial inspections have been particularly valuable in revealing practical problems of CWC implementation that could not have been predicted from paper studies alone. During the treaty negotiations in Geneva, which lasted from 1984 to 1992, the results of NTIs performed by participating states prompted the revision of several aspects of the CWC verification regime. For example, trial inspections:

revealed the limitations of using materials-balance calculations to detect the diversion of scheduled chemicals to prohibited activities, resulting in a shift to a more qualitative approach to verification;

proved the utility of an initial (baseline) visit to a commercial plant and the negotiation of a facility agreement for limiting the intrusiveness of routine inspections and protecting the legitimate interests of the inspected facility;

tested various approaches to sampling and analysis, while revealing the limitations of this approach;

demonstrated the need to go beyond the inspection of Schedule 2 and 3 facilities to indude "other relevant" facilities that might be capable of producing significant quantities of scheduled chemicals;

indicated that certain inspection techniques could demonstrate CWC compliance without compromising confidential business information (CBI) unrelated to the treaty; and

clarified the logistical requirements of CWC inspections, such as transportation and communications, and provided rough estimates of their direct and indirect costs.

NTIs and mock inspections performed to date have shed the most light on three aspects of CWC verification: auditing plant records, chemical sampling and analysis, and safeguarding CBI. These three topics are discussed in detail below.

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III. Auditing of Plant Records

NTIs have suggested that auditing production records to detect the diversion of scheduled chemicals through "mass-balance" calculations--i.e., by comparing input quantities of feedstock materials against output quantities of finished products and wastes--is not the most efficient use of inspection time. Because many plants produce large volumes of scheduled chemicals, the diversion of small but significant percentages of such chemicals could probably be hidden within the error range of mass-balance calculations.

A better way to assess the validity of production records is to check them for internal consistency. This test involves matching up the dates and content of records dealing with the same batch of chemicals but located in different parts of a large plant site. For example, drums of feedstock logged out of a warehouse must have been logged into the production plant on the same day; similarly, the final product must have been logged out of the production plant and into another warehouse for delivery to the customer. Because of these intermeshing records, it would be extremely difficult for a company engaged in illicit CW-agent production to prepare a false set of books that would be internally consistent for the scale of operations at a large chemical manufacturing facility.

Cross-checking production records over short time intervals selected at random by the inspection team would make it possible to authenticate records quickly, while limiting the risk of disclosure of CBI. Indeed, a trial inspection of a commercial chemical plant in England showed that, given a basic knowledge of the raw materials used to make the chemicals being audited, inspectors could verify the internal consistency of the plant records for a randomly selected month, week, and batch number. The discovery of obvious discrepancies among interrelated records would raise suspicions about compliance and cause the inspection team to become more intrusive.

NTIs have also suggested that as a further means of protecting CBI during record audits, companies should segregate the information needed for routine verification of records (e.g., dates of delivery of scheduled chemicals, quantities shipped, and shipping dates) from sensitive commercial information (e.g., names of suppliers and customers, prices, and chemical process technologies).

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IV. Sampling and Analysis

Trial inspections have also been useful for testing procedures and equipment for on-site chemical sampling and analysis, and suggesting the time and effort required. There are four possible types of sampling: (1) of feedstocks; (2) of finished products, to detect the presence of scheduled chemicals, both dedared and undeclared; (3) of wastes, to detect the presence of scheduled chemicals or their degradation products; and (4) of the plant environment (including air, surfaces, or soil) to look for telltale indicators of the illict production of Schedule 1 chemicals.

NTIs conducted by France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, and other countries have yielded the following lessons about chemical sampling and analysis:

Sampling can be time-consuming and requires at least a three-man team to conduct effectively. Furthermore, industrial safety procedures for sampling hazardous materials are stringent and require proper certification of analytical equipment and use of trained site personnel.

Modern chemical plants have long, complex pipe runs that do not easily permit sampling at multiple points. In one NTI, the inspection team used a process flowchart to identify the optimal sampling locations needed to verify that the production process was as declared and that no scheduled chemicals were present.

During the initial visit to a facility, locations can be identified where CWC inspectors expect that frequent sampling will be necessary. If such points are not readily accessible, companies might consider equipping them with suitable sample-taking devices.

Samples should, as a rule, be analyzed within the boundaries of the inspected facility; off-site analysis is warranted only if suitable equipment and reference samples are not available on-site. Procedures for the transport of samples to an off-site certified laboratory must maintain the integrity of the samples taken, ensure transportation safety, and preserve an unbroken chain of custody during storage, transport, and analysis.

A non-accusatory darification procedure should be developed for cases when the results of a chemical analysis are suggestive of a treaty violation.

Chemical sampling is generally complementary to the inspection of equipment and the auditing of plant records as a means of verifying industry compliance with the CWC, but it has certain limitations. First, it can only reveal the presence or absence of scheduled chemicals at a given facility and is not an effective tool for verifying the quantities of scheduled chemicals produced, processed, or consumed there.

A second limitation of chemical sampling is that although ultra-sensitive analytical techniques can detect trace levels of scheduled chemicals, such minute quantities may be misleading if they result inadvertently from the reaction of chemicals present in the plant environment (e.g., the chance reaction of thiodiglycol with hydrochloric acid to yield sulfur mustard, a Schedule 1 chemical). This problem of "false positives" must be taken into account when using chemical sampling and analysis to assess industry compliance.

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V. Safeguarding Confidential Business Information (CBI)

During initial murine inspections of chemical plants, companies can safeguard CBI by helping to negotiate a "facility agreement" containing guidelines for all future routine inspections at that site. Plant officials do not have to grant the inspection team access to commercially sensitive areas or to data that do not contribute directly to the verification of CWC compliance. Categories of information falling outside the scope of the inspection regime include technical details of the production process (e.g., temperature, pressure, catalysts, etc.) and marketing information.

Another strategy for safeguarding CBI is for the inspected facility to store sensitive documents that the inspection team must consult repeatedly (e.g., photographs, process flow charts, or notebooks) in a safe located at the facility. After each routine inspection, the host facility may specify which documents used by the inspection team must be left inside the locked container.

In a further attempt to limit the intrusiveness of CWC inspections, a Japanese NTI tested the concept of dividing an inspection into three phases and evaluating the results at the end of each phase. If no-anomalies had emerged by the end of the first or second phase, the inspection was terminated early. This approach could significantly reduce the burden of inspections on commercial facilities.

Several NTIs have examined approaches to chemical sampling and analysis that yield sufficient information to demonstrate treaty compliance while allowing industry to protect the confidentiality of proprietary chemicals and reaction mechanisms. Such approaches include:

verifying the non-production of Schedule 1 chemicals by sampling feedstocks and finished products but not intermediate mixtures, which may contain proprietary catalysts;

employing "blinded" analytical instruments that indicate the presence or absence of scheduled chemicals but provide minimal information on chemicals not relevant to the CWC; and

allowing personnel from the inspected facility to analyze the samples on-site, where practicable, under the close observation of the inspection team.


In addition, the use of rapid-screening techniques can reduce the number of samples that must be collected for analysis and thus minimize disclosure of CBI. Such instruments include:

a hand-held ion-mobility spectrometer, which can give an indication of the contents of storage containers and assist in the selection of samples for analysis;

a portable gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer (GC-MS), which can be employed as a rapid-screening device for scheduled chemicals without disclosing information on chemicals unrelated to the CWC;

a flame-photometric detector, which can be used to detect phosphorus and sulfur, two elements present in many CW agents; and

non-destructive evaluation (NDE) systems, which employ ultrasound, neutron-activation and other methods to identify the contents of sealed storage tanks suspected of containing scheduled chemicals.

Although the various instruments listed above may not be appropriate in all cases, they offer promising ways of verifying compliance with the CWC while helping to satisfy industry's concerns over safeguarding CBI.

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VI. Managed-Access Techniques

The challenge inspection regime contained in the CWC permits a State Party to request an inspection of any facility, private or government-owned, declared or undeclared, on the territory of another State Party or under its jurisdiction and control. An undeclared challenged site must give the inspection team some access no later than 120 hours (5 days) after notification. In contrast, a declared challenged site must provide access no later than 39 hours after notification. As a safeguard against harassing challenge requests, the Executive Council (a 41-country body that will oversee the day-to-day operation of the international CWC organization) may vote by a two-thirds majority to block a challenge inspection not later than 12 hours after notification if the challenge request is judged "frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope"of the treaty.

Several NTIs have demonstrated that it is possible to balance the treaty obligation to demonstrate compliance against the right to protect CBI through the use of "managed-access" techniques. These measures include removing or covering accessible papers, switching off computers, and shrouding sensitive equipment or control panels. The challenged facility is not required to identify shrouded objects but merely to demonstrate that they are not CWC-related. According to a German report on a trial challenge inspection, "There was no site in Germany, government or industrial, where access could not either be granted or managed. Experience showed that a balance can be struck between adequate intrusiveness and legitimate protection of information."


The CWC states that the inspection team "should avoid undue intrusion" into industrial activities not prohibited by the treaty. For example, the inspectors do not need to know the details of a proprietary process to determine that it is not involved in the production of chemical weapons. In the case of a laboratory or pilot plant where confidential research and development is under way, access may be limited to allowing one or two inspectors to take a brief glance from a doorway so as to ascertain that no obviously illicit activities are under way. Furthermore, the challenged facility is not required to specify in advance which parts of the site are considered sensitive and hence are off-limits. Instead, the inspection team may be given free rein until they ask to examine an area to which access must be denied.

Where there are particular concerns about confidentiality, companies should identify in advance the sensitive information and processes they wish to protect and be prepared to suggest alternative means of satisfying the compliance concerns. To this end, companies should develop a range of options for areas of a facility where access may have to be restricted. In general, cooperating with the inspection team to find mutually satisfactory means of resolving compliance concerns will greatly fadlitate the inspection process.

Chemical firms should consider training a small core team of senior plant representatives to prepare for inspections and to escort the inspection team around the facility. NTls have also demonstrated the need of the challenged facility to have technical and policy advice that can only be provided by government representatives. For this reason, a senior U.S. official will head the host team during initial routine inspections and challenge inspections and will serve as the main point of contact with the CWC inspection team.

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VII. Costs of Trial Inspections

Private companies have expressed concern about the burden posed by the CWC inspection regime, particularly in terms of the person-hours needed to prepare for and host inspections. An NTI performed by Sweden found that while inspections did not sigruficantly impair the operations or safety of a plant, the need for senior facility personnel to escort and assist the inspection team diverted them from the performance of their normal duties.

For this reason, the company expenditures associated with inspections will consist largely of personnel costs. NTIs have suggested the following rough estimates for the number of person-days required to prepare for and host inspections:

initial inspection of Schedule 2 plant: 2.5 person-days;

negotiation of facility agreement: 10 person-days;

routine (96-hour) inspection of a Schedule 2 plant: 25 - 30 person-days;

routine (24-hour) inspection of a Schedule 3 plant: 4 person-days.

One U.S. company has estimated the cost of hosting a five-person inspection team at $5,000 per day. Such costs are likely to decline over time, however, as companies make one-time investments (e.g., procurernent of equipment shrouds) and move down the learning curve with respect to preparation procedures.

Companies should also consider and propose strategies for demonstrating CWC compliance in ways that minimize disruption of the plant's ongoing activities. Possible options include giving the inspection team a simplified process-flow diagram or granting access to waste outflows, feedstocks, and filling points. Similarly, allowing the inspection team to check vehicles entering and leaving the site on a random basis would provide confidence that no CW-related material is being removed, without interfering with production and delivery schedules.

Another concern on the part of industry has been that CWC-related inspections--trial or real--could give rise to bad publicity, such as rumors that the participating company is somehow involved with chemical weapons or highly toxic materials. Experience has shown that excessive secrecy about NTIs can be counterproductive; a successful approach has been to minimize speculation and rumors by actively educating the public about the purpose of the CWC and the trial inspection. The U.S. Government can assist with such public information efforts.

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VIII. Need for Additional NTIs

No trial inspections of chemical plants have been performed since the CWC was opened for signature in January 1993, mainly because the participating countries have focused on work at the CWC Preparatory Cornmission (PrepCom) in The Hague. Additional NTIs are needed, however, since most of the earlier trial inspections were based on draft procedures that have since been modified or further elaborated in the final version of the treaty. Moreover, the large majority of NTIs have been conducted on a strictly national basis and hence did not take into account the greater complexities entailed by a multinational inspection team.

Trial inspections performed on a national or multinational basis would be particularly useful during the period immediately preceding the treaty's entry into force. Such exercises could:

provide realistic tests of the workability of the more detailed proposed inspection procedures, particularly after the PrepCom has prepared a first draft of the inspection manual;

offer participants a hands-on educational experience, which will be an essential component of any inspector training program;

help companies identify sensitive items of equipment and process know-how and to develop effective managed-access techniques for safeguarding CBI;

facilitate development of specific details of inspection procedures by the PrepCom, such as sampling and analysis techniques;

prepare Schedule 2 facilities for the initial-visit and facility-agreement phases of CWC implementation; and

help commercial companies to become familiar with U.S. Government assets to help prepare for, assist, and facilitate inspections.

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IX. For More Information

Officials of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) are prepared to meet with industry representatives to sketch out the planning process involved in conducting an NTI, a mock inspection, or a vulnerability assessment of a commerdal facility. Depending on a company's specific goals and the desired level of realism, trial inspections can be performed independently or in conjunction with U.S. Government officials. For further information, contact Bob Waters at the ACDA Office of Public Information, tel. (202) 647-8677.


CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY

No. 3

February 1994


CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION UPDATE FOR INDUSTRY

An Information Paper Published by the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
No. 3, February 1994

OVERVIEW

The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) represent a delicate balance--achieved through arduous negotiations--between the need for a compliance monitoring regime that is stringent enough to deter violators and build international confidence in the CWC, and the desire to protect national security and commercial secrets unrelated to the treaty.

This information paper, the third in a series on the relationship between the CWC and U.S. industry, discusses how companies covered by the treaty's declaration and inspection requirements can protect their confidential business information (CBI) from unauthorized disclosure.

In particular, the paper reviews how the provisions of the CWC effectively address industry's concerns about the disclosure of CBI in dedarations and during on-site inspections. Also discussed are specific measures that companies can take to prepare for inspections so as to safeguard their valuable trade secrets.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. The Verification Regime
   
2. Treaty Provisions on CBI
   
3. Preparing for Inspections
   
4. Safeguarding CBI in Declarations and Reports
   
5. Conclusions
   
6. Questions and Answers
   

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II. Treaty Provisions on CBI

In response to industry's concerns, the Chemical Weapons Convention contains provisions designed to protect CBI from unauthorized disclosure. These provisions were developed during the treaty negotiations in Geneva with the active participation of the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association and other trade associations representing the international chemical industry. The major provisions are as follows:

Article VI states that CWC inspection teams shall "avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this Convention";

Article VIII specifies that the teams must perform inspections "in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives";

Article IX, in its provisions on challenge inspections, gives the inspected State Party "the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data, not related to this Convention";

Part II of the Annex on Implementation and Verification states that the activities of the inspection team "shall be so arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected State Party or Host State and disturbance to the facility or area inspected";

The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information lays out detailed guidelines for the handling of CBI.

For routine inspections of plant sites that produce Schedule 2 chemicals, facility agreements (negotiated between the OPCW and the U.S. Government with the active involvement of the inspected facility) will specify which parts of a plant are subject to inspection, the scope of inspection in agreed areas, the storage of confidential information on-site, the taking of samples and their analysis, access to records, and the use of instruments. Facility agreements may also be negotiated on a voluntary basis for plant sites that make Schedule 3 chemicals and for other chemical production facilities.

In the case of challenge inspections, the CWC allows the inspected State Party and facility representatives to negotiate with the inspection team over the extent of access that will be granted beyond that already provided during routine inspections. According to Part X ("Challenge Inspections") of the Annex on Implementation and Verification,

"... the inspected State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive
installations and prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to chemical
weapons. Such measures may include, inter alia:

1. Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces;
   
   
2. Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
   
   
3. Shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems;
   
   
4. Logging off of computer systems and turning off of data indicating devices;
   
   
5. Restriction of sample analysis to presence or absence of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 or appropriate degradation products;
   
   
6. Using random selective access techniques whereby the inspectors are asked to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to inspect (the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive buildings);
   
   
7. In exceptional cases, giving only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site."

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III. Preparing for Inspections

In addition to negotiating facility agreements, companies can safeguard CBI by performing pre-inspection assessments and by training plant personnel and escorts. Although the costs of such preparations must be borne by industry, the U.S. Government will provide information and technical assistance on request. The extent to which a commercial plant should prepare for CWC inspections depends on the sensitivity of the work being done there.

When preparing for on-site inspections, companies may want to assess which types of information must be protected and then develop a concrete plan of action. For example, a plant site preparing for an inspection might consider taking some or all of the following measures:

1. Segregate production records relating to scheduled chemicals so as to protect CBI not relevant to treaty compliance;

2. Inventory plant equipment and processes and identify which activities are particularly sensitive and vulnerable to observation;

3. Determine which aspects of a critical process or item of equipment must be protected (e.g., size, shape);

4. Plan out a route for the inspectors through the facility that will keep them out of areas containing CBI unrelated to the treaty;

5. Train a core group of senior plant managers to escort the inspection team through the facility;

6. Inform plant personnel about which parts of the facility will be subject to inspection, how to make their work areas secure, and how to answer inspectors' questions honestly without revealing CBI and in accordance with their Constitutional rights;

7. Turn off computers, remove confidential papers, and install shrouds, boxes, or screens to shield sensitive equipment immediately prior to an inspection;

8. Run mock inspections to see how well the safeguards work, and adjust procedures accordingly; and

9. Sustain employee training efforts through periodic exercises and reassessments.

Ideally, the vulnerability assessment process should identify the most cost-effective approach for safeguarding CBI. Without careful planning, companies may tend to overprotect their confidential assets, resulting in unnecessary preparation costs. For example, rather than making a costly shroud for a piece of sensitive equipment, it may be sufficient to cover upa gauge or a label with a piece of masking tape, move a portable object to another room, or turn it around.

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IV. Safeguarding CBI in Declarations and Reports

Security mechanisms will be established at both the national and international levels to safeguard CBI contained in industry declarations and inspection reports. At the national level, an administrative entity called the U.S. Office of the National Authority (ONA) will compile and process industry declarations collected by the Department of Commerce and forward them to the OPCW. During this process, the ONA--to be operated by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-will be responsible for protecting any CBI that U.S. companies submit in their required declarations.

At the international level, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague will have primary responsibility for the security of all confidential information and samples submitted to the organization. To this end, the CWC includes an Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, which seeks to safeguard CBI disclosed in required declarations and inspection reports. According to this annex, the OPCW shall:

subject data designated confidential by a State Party to a system of formal classification, secure storage, and other security measures to protect against unauthorized access;

require staff members to enter into individual secrecy agreements with the organization;

limit distribution of confidential information within the OPCW on a strict need-to-know basis;

handle and store information--to the greatest extent consistent with effective verification--in a form that precludes direct identification of the facility to which it pertains;

establish a commission for the settlement of disputes related to breaches of confidentiality; and

take "appropriate punitive and disciplinary measures" to be established by the Director-General for punishing the wrongful disclosure of CBI, including the power to waive an inspector's immunity from prosecution "in cases of serious breaches."

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V. Conclusions

Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention effectively address industry's concerns about the potential loss of CBI pursuant to treaty-mandated declarations and inspections. In particular, the treaty limits the international inspection team's access to CBI and gives the inspected State Party measures to safeguard such information from disclosure.

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VI. Questions and Answers

Q. How can companies protect CBI contained in chemical samples that the inspection team may take during an inspection ?

A. Whenever possible, the analysis of chemical samples will be performed on-site with equipment provided by the inspection team or by the inspected facility, and will be limited to determining the presence or absence of scheduled chemicals. If an anomaly is found, the inspectors have the right to take samples to a designated outside laboratory for more detailed analysis. In this case, the OPCW is responsible for preserving the confidentiality of any trade secrets in the samples.

Q. How will the OPCW ensure the integrity of inspectors?

A. The OPCW will carefully screen candidate inspectors to avoid those individuals who might pose a security risk. In addition, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force, the OPCW Technical Secretariat will communicate the names, nationalities, and ranks of all inspectors and assistants to the States Parties, who will then have 30 days to indicate which of them are unacceptable for any reason and hence cannot be used in inspections of that State Party.

Q. When will model facility agreements become available?

A. The Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), the body of CWC signatory states that is working out the details of treaty implementation, plans to complete its work on model facility agreements by late spring 1994. These documents may then be made available to selected members of the chemical industry for testing and evaluation. Once formally adopted by the PrepCom, the model facility agreements will be made generally available to industry.

Q. What is the rationale for not extending the requirement for facility agreements to Schedule 3 plants and other chemical production facilities?

A. The time and cost of negotiating facility agreements deterred the participating countries from making such agreements mandatory for Schedule 3 facilities and other chemical production facilities, which were judged to pose a lesser risk to the object and purpose of the Convention and thus require less intrusive inspections. Nevertheless, States Parties are entitled to negotiate facility agreements on a voluntary basis for Schedule 3 plant sites and other chemical production facilities.

Q. How will company officials participate in the negotiation of facility agreements?

A. It is expected that during the initial inspection of a plant site, a representative of the U.S. National Authority and the CWC inspection team will negotiate the facility agreement with the direct participation of company representatives.

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