COPIES OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972

JUNE 13, 1972.--Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 13, 1972.

Hon. Carl B. ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Speaker: I transmit herewith copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these Agreements are also being forwarded to the President of the Senate. I am asking the Senate’s advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitations between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect, is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these Agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes -- a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected -- I strongly recommend that the House of Representatives support The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

I transmit herewith the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new area of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our scrutiny and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these Agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes -- a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected -- I strongly recommend that the House of Representatives support The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

RICHARD NIXON.

Department of State
Washington, June 10, 1972

THE PRESIDENT
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recommendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

In a broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and sixteen Articles. As indicated in Article I(l), it provides for limitations on antiballistic reissue (ABM) systems as well as certain related measures. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set forth common premises and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraph indicate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on anti-ballistic missile systems will be an important factor in curbing competition in the strategic offensive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and will, together win certain agreed measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, create a favorable climate for future negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indicate the relationship of this Treaty to the undertaking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and express the intention of the Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad international consensus that effective measures to limit strategic arms will assist in relaxing international tensions and strengthening trust between nations. As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic steps toward these broader political goals.

Article I(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM systems which would provide defense covering substantially the whole of the territory of a Party. ABM defenses of individual regions are also prohibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. As more fully explained below, that Article limits not only the number, size and location permitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article I(2) also includes an undertaking not to provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense. This would, for example, prohibit the construction and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capable radars deployed for other purposes, that could provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Articles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence or other non-ABM systems per se. However, it does prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems or their components to perform an ABM role; moreover, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any phased-array radars over a certain size except as otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. This would prevent the possible use of such radars as a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory". It indicates that such systems currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an interceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role (including target tracking or missile control, but not early warning), or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear that the ABM system components listed in the first paragraph of the Article include not only those which are operational, but also those under construction, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM systems or their components except as provided therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited deployment of such systems described in the next two paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one deployment area centered on nation's capital and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) within one other deployment area having the same radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The centers of the two deployment areas will be separated by no less than 1,300 kilometers.

In each of these deployment areas a Party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. These totals would include any deployments within such areas for training purposes and, as indicated in Article II(2), would not be confined to those in operational status. In view of Article V(1), discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM components may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars covers radars of both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern type which scans by electronic means, a capability especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM radar complexes, the permitted area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars may not be located outside such complexes, regardless of when they become operational. Mechanical-scan ABM radars that become operational after May 26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties understand that in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with this provision, the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may have:

The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in such a deployment area on the date of signature were the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand that the potential -- the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters -- of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems currently deployed or under construction would be as follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being deployed by the United States in the vicinity of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it would preclude the completion or retention of the ABM complex on which construction had been started in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. (The signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that would be prohibited thereby in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at a deployment area centered on its national capital, and the Soviet Union has not started construction at a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan USSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(I) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: Article II(l) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty. (As explained below, Article XIV calls for establishment of Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM systems or components is constrained by the various limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See paragraph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and Article VI.)

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified by the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Since no more than one ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted by Article III, this Article will apply, when the Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components previously under construction by the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of the signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not effect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their location along the periphery of each Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warnings radars would not be affected. Article V imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array-radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding the million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be effected.

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligations of the United States under any international agreement.

Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance or compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification

The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion and overhaul practices.

Article XII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise the question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions if interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impending verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty -- such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force -- and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibility of the Commission trader the Interim Agreement, see section C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. The clause provides that, each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decisions is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XlV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These questions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article XVl and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authenticity of the English and Russian language texts.

The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, l972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that:

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I prescribes July 1, 1972, as the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of rite Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active construction estimated to be about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and training purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in effect, neither Party may start new construction (nor resume previously suspended construction) of fixed ICBM launchers except test and training launchers.

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 ICBM into a launcher for an S3-9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider an ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM.

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition, Article III and the Protocol permit launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear powered submarines for the United States, subject to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, such substitution may not result in:

Construction of replacement SLBM launchers up to the limits under the Protocol would require the dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers deployed on any type of submarine would count against the total ceiling on SLBM Iaunchers. Dismantling or destruction would be required to commence no later than the date on which sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to begin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dismantling or destruction, as well as timely notification thereof, are to be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Parties agree that the number of test and training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, including "modern heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased significantly above the current number of test and training launchers for such missiles. It is understood that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for the purposes of testing and training. It is also understood that ICBM launchers for test and training purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Interim Agreement may be undertaken. The conversion of current United States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles, the conversion of current submarine launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the construction of new submarines as replacements for older submarines, are not prohibited by the Agreement.

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the same provisions on verification as appear in Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried out by national technical means operating in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. Interference with, or deliberate concealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither Party is required to change its current practices of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission to be established pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue active negotiation for limitations on strategic offensive arms. This Article also provides that the terms of the Interim Agreement will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that these subsequent negotiations will start in the near future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the Interim Agreement shall remain in effect for five years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each Party with a right, parallel to that contained in paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to withdraw upon six months’ notice if such Party decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Interim Agreement.

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, together with the accompanying Interim Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic offensive arms, constitute the most important step in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In these agreements the two most powerful nations on earth are adopting measures to curb the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests during the careful negotiation and elaboration of these agreements. We did not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our Allies, who were regularly consulted during the negotiations. The Congress has been kept closely informed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador Smith and other Delegation members conducted a total of thirty executive session briefings for Congressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order. The entry into force of these measures should significantly advance the cause of peace in the word, and I hope that they can be brought into force as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM A. ROGERS.