[Report by Gennadiy Obolenskiy: `Pentagon May State Its All']
[FBIS Translated Text] The discussion of questions connected with the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms II [START II] in continuing in U.S. Congressional committees. In this connection, it would not be out of place to recall that the limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons envisaged in it, partially already implemented, have only became possible under conditions of the preservation of the 1972 ABM Treaty of unlimited duration.
This reminder is appropriate in connection with the paradoxical nature of the situation that has taken shape during the hearings. On the one hand, representatives of the Pentagon and the administration as a whole are expressing a clear desire for a real limitation of strategic offensive weapons (of course, primarily Russian ones). And on the other hand they want to evade observing the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty through agreeing with Russia the kind of parameters of so-called non-strategic anti-missile defense (or theater ABM ) which would make this system entirely capable of setting strategic tasks too.
The idea of conducting talks on demarcating strategic and non-strategic ABM defense and agreeing on the specifications of the latter in the form of a separate accord was proposed to us by the Americans. Even the specific time schedules for conducting them were outlined. Reports have appeared to the effect that within the Pentagon's apparatus the accelerated preparation of a draft of such an agreement has begun. But the Americans themselves unexpectedly refused to continue the talks. Why?
Undoubtedly the emergence of a republican majority in the U.S. Congress plays a fairly major role here. The Congressmen have obviously decided not to be hasty as regards expanding cooperation with Russia and will try to wring new concessions from it. And in this connection, [they have decided] not to be in any hurry with getting up the ABM accord proposed by Washington shortly beforehand.
But there is also another side to this matter. The Americans' proposals on ABM defense have proved to be in direct contradiction to the limitations on strategic offensive arms envisaged by the START-II Treaty, and may hinder its ratification. And after all, it is extremely advantageous for the United States, and Washington is very interested in its implementation. That is why it should be expected that following the conclusion of the ratification process, the Americans proceed to additional steps to `push through' ideas in the sphere of anti-missile defense that will in fact lead to the collapse of the
Discussions can also be heard among independent American experts to the effect that once it has achieved significant reductions of Russian strategic offensive weapons, the Pentagon will stake its all, and, using its own homespun interpretations of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, will de facto stop taking it into account. Particularly since in the Pentagon's understanding, the ABM Treaty will not restrict the theater ABM . Admittedly, at the same time, the fact that this is a question of mobile ground-, sea-, and air-based ABM systems, which are banned by this treaty, is being deliberately kept quiet.
And I would like to stress the following here. Until the sides agree where the distinction between authorized and banned activity lies in respect of such ABM systems, there are no grounds for stating unilaterally that the creation of a particular ABM theater of military operations systems corresponds to the treaty and does not undermine it. Otherwise, the entire process of arms control might as well be scrapped.
Although the rumors about a `Russian nuclear mafia' are somewhat exaggerated, according to Mikhail Kulik, Northern Fleet military prosecutor's office investigator for special cases, cited by the paper CHAS PIK, there are criminal groupings in the Northwest region that are busy trying to get into depots containing nuclear materials.
The conference in St. Petersburg was attended by atomic energy specialists from Russia, the CIS countries, and Lithuania, senior officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency European Commission, representatives of the European Fuel Cycle Consortium, and nuclear experts. It was noted that the EU spent $400 million in 1991-1994 on improving the system of safeguarding nuclear safety in the countries on the territory of the former USSR. This involves training specialists at Obninsk and developing a robot capable of performing radioactivity measures, which is being designed at the Radium Institute in St. Petersburg. It was stressed that the EU is interested in importing nuclear materials from Russia on the basis of proper agreements, provided that effective international nonproliferation guarantees are found.