[Report by Aleksandr Koretskiy: `START II Hearings. Cuts Are In Order Because There Are No Maintenance Funds']
[FBIS Translated Text] The ratification of the START II treaty (on further cutting and limiting strategic offensive weapons) will help Russia minimize the difference between its nuclear potential and that of the United States. As for Russia's counter-force potential, it will even grow 20 percent despite the cuts as a result of the implementation of START II owing to a marked decrease in the corresponding potential of the United States. Such is only the smaller part of the arguments by those who advocate the ratification of the treaty voiced in the course of the first open hearings in the Duma. The final conclusions on the feasibility and, perhaps, additional terms of ratification will be drawn in September--there will be separate hearings on the financial aspects of START II implementation. One can already today, however, say with confidence: despite the pessimistic forecasts of its opponents, the treaty will be ratified with no special problems by the current State Duma.
The treaty was signed by Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in Moscow 3 January 1993. Many a lance has been broken since over the ratification problem both in Russia and the United States: some congressmen are sure that START II considerably lowers America's defense potential. A similar view, but as applied to Russia, is also voiced by a number of Russian deputies.
The Russian politicians primarily doubt the feasibility of what is at first sight an abrupt change in the structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces: under the treaty, the sea-based component of Russia's nuclear forces should be upped from 30 percent to between 50 and 58 percent. And this should be done by cutting the number of ground-based missiles. Russia will in fact have to scrap the new generation SS-18 and SS-19 ground-based intercontinental missiles. Shifting the center of gravity to sea-based missiles can take place only in theory: 90 percent of the submarine missile cruisers were built before 1990, which implies that their service life will be up in the year 2015. Russia actually does not build new subs--their keels have been laid but construction has been halted by lack of funds. A relative stability will only prevail in strategic aviation--the fleet of Tu-95 MS and Tu-160 bombers will be cut under the treaty by as little as 24 bombers. By 1998, the Air Force is supposed to have not more than 113 planes whereas their number today is 137. and 53 of them are outside Russia (7 in Kazakhstan and 44 in Ukraine), for which reason no Russian planes should be scrapped. Incidentally, it came to light during the hearings that Moscow did not lose all interest in Ukrainian strategic aviation at all--the Russian Air Force is still counting on it.
All the military strategy doubts of the politicians were dispelled by Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff. He thinks that by cutting the number of warheads to 3,500, START II facilitates the formation of a grouping of strategic offensive forces which is adequate to that of the United States. Indeed, reducing the number of warheads mounted on intercontinental missiles and submarine-based missiles does not call for remodeling or replacing the MRV [multiple reentry vehicle] platform and the destruction of the warheads removed from them, which gives potential advantages--this creates the danger of a quick increase in nuclear potential if the United States pulls out of the treaty. In this case, the United States will have more warheads than Russia by 55 percent. But this is still less than what it would have had under START I. This is to say, the United States is not getting a real edge, while Russia retains the effectiveness of its nuclear forces in retaliatory actions.
As regards the change in the structure, Zhurbenko stated that it would have to be altered in any case--most ground-based missiles are at the end of their useful life. They are supposed to be replaced by new missiles which Russia does not have. More accurately, there is no base for building heavy missiles of the SS-18 and SS-19 type which are produced in the Ukrainian `Yuzhmash.' In principle, industrial cooperation could be arranged, but after Kiev joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, this opportunity was lost. As a result, Russia is able today to produce on its own only one type of missile--the single warhead `Topol,' on whose basis its ground based forces will be developing. Plans call for production of two versions of this missile--one for the existing mobile missile systems, and the new `Topol-M' system.
An important START II provision, the military thinks, is the fact that, in the number of warheads, the treaty brings U.S. nuclear forces down closer to a level which Russia is objectively capable of maintaining. The Russian military, one might say, dreamed of really counting in the warheads carried by bombers provided for by START II. The thing is that under START I, each Russian strategic bomber can carry 8 nuclear-tipped missiles (in reality this figure is 6), whereas a U.S. Air Force bomber can carry 10 missiles (in reality 20).
Generally, the military and diplomats convinced the deputies: START II is almost manna as far as Russia is concerned. At any rate, Russia cannot afford forces that the USSR could have hardly maintained. The problem is not so much direct funding but also the industrial and technological base that ended up on the territory of independent CIS republics. when all is said and done, we should also take account of Russia's new geostrategic situation, different foreign policy priorities, and the development of military technology.