09 November 1999
(Nov. 9: Discuss ABM Treaty, CTBT, other issues) (8,170) Ambassador John Holum and Norman Wolf were the guests November 9 on the U.S. Department of State's Worldnet "Dialogue" program on "U.S. Policy on Nuclear Non-proliferation." Holum is senior advisor for arms control and international security affairs at the U.S. Department of State, and Wolf is senior advisor and special representative of the President for nuclear non-proliferation. Questions from journalists in Moscow, Prague and Kiev focused on U.S. intentions with regard to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the recent failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). .............. In response to questions about the ABM Treaty, Holum said the United States has "no intention" of withdrawing from the treaty. "What we are trying to do is work cooperatively with our Russian partner to negotiate modest amendments to the treaty that would permit deployment of a national missile defense that would not threaten Russia's deterrent, that wouldn't have any significant capability against Russia, but would allow both countries to deploy modest national missile defense systems to protect us against the rogue state threat." Holum said the amendments the United States seeks will strengthen rather than weaken or undercut the treaty "because they demonstrate that this treaty that was negotiated in 1972 can be adjusted, can be modified to account for new realities, for threats that weren't contemplated at the time the treaty was negotiated." Regarding concerns that the United States is abandoning arms control efforts and multilateral fora such as the United Nations, Wolf said that "nothing could be further from the truth." "More and more it is recognized in the United States that our security is inherently that of the security of the rest of the world, and that the non-proliferation effort must in fact be a global effort," he said. Following is a transcript of the program: (begin transcript) WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of Broadcast Services Washington, D.C. GUESTS: Ambassador John Holum, Senior Advisor for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State Norman Wolf, Senior Advisor and Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Non-proliferation TOPIC: U.S. Policy on Nuclear Non-proliferation POSTS: Moscow, Prague and Kiev HOST: Rick Foucheux DATE: November 9, 1999 TIME: 07:00 - 08:00 EST MR. FOUCHEUX: Good afternoon, and welcome to a special edition of Worldnet's "Dialogue." I am Rick Foucheux. ............ In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on the outlines of the START III agreement, which would cut the two countries' strategic arsenals even more deeply, to 80 percent below their Cold War peaks. Senior U.S. and Russian officials began meeting late this summer to discuss both START III and the ABM Treaty. (End videotape.) MR. FOUCHEUX: We are most fortunate to have with us today two key such officials, Mr. John D. Holum, the administration's senior adviser for arms control and nuclear security affairs; also joining us today is Norm Wolf, the administration's senior adviser and chief negotiator for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Good morning both of you, welcome very much to our program. ........... We now welcome our participants who are standing by in Moscow, Prague and Kiev. Let's begin with your questions and comments. ......... Q: Sergei -- (inaudible) -- newspaper. The United States has not ratified the NPT -- the Senate has not ratified the NPT treaty. To what extent will this complicate or compound the U.S. position on the ABM Treaty talks with Russia? Thank you. AMB. HOLUM: Well, we do intend to continue the effort to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This is a detour. It is not a reversal. We are not changing course. This was a very abbreviated debate brought up in an unfortunate partisan circumstance that didn't allow members of the Senate to examine the treaty closely. And for us to do the normal kind of review that we do, for example, when we ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to attach understandings and other steps to the resolution of ratification that makes it more appealing to more senators -- that kind of effort still remains to be done. Remember that the United States is not preventing the treaty from entering into force. We regret that we are not leading now the cause to ratify the treaty, that the United States is not among those who have ratified. But there are 17 other countries whose ratification is essential in order for the treaty to enter into force. As we continue our own efforts in the United States, we are going to encourage others as well to ratify the treaty. I view that as a distinct issue from the ABM Treaty modifications we are working on with our Russian colleagues. The reason for seeking modest amendments to the ABM Treaty is to deal with the circumstance of a few countries who seem to be remaining outside the global norm, the global agreement against both nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities. We are not seeking a major disruption of the ABM Treaty; we are seeking a moderate adjustment of the treaty, not involving any nuclear testing, any nuclear capabilities, but the ability to deal with a few tens of incoming weapons from a country such as North Korea or Iran, who are developing the capability to send missiles and weapons of mass destruction over inter-continental ranges. But this is a proposal that does not in our judgment upset the nuclear balance. It poses no threat to the nuclear deterrent of Russia. We think it should therefore be negotiable in our work with Russia, as well as ultimately other members of the treaty. .............. MR. FOUCHEUX: We thank you for those questions, Kiev. Let's move on once again to Moscow. Moscow, please go ahead with your questions or comments for our guests. Q: Mr. Holum, currently in Russia they're frankly talking about a new cold phase in the relationship between Washington and Moscow. This cannot help but negatively impact the whole negotiation process, disarmament process. What does Washington intend to do to ameliorate and rectify this situation? AMB. HOLUM: Well, I hope that proves not to be the case. We have made enormous progress bilaterally between the Soviet Union and Russia and the United States in turning back the potential for nuclear holocaust and in lessening the role of nuclear weapons and reducing their numbers. The START II treaty will eliminate -- to bring us down to below 60 or 65 percent below the Cold War peaks of nuclear weapons when that's brought into force. The Helsinki agreement in 1997 between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin will bring us 80 percent below Cold War peaks. In the meantime we are intensely engaged in cooperative efforts to bear the cost of taking down not only the nuclear delivery systems but actually dismantling warheads and bombs. We are working cooperatively on steps to dispose of spent fuel, to dispose of plutonium extracted from nuclear weapons, to purchase and ultimately burn up highly-enriched uranium that comes out of nuclear weapons. So there is a broad range of cooperative efforts. Now, it's true that we've had various times during the course of the last decade down periods in our relationship. Political tensions have tended to rise and fall. One of the things I think that is encouraging about the trend is that we have managed to keep these programs going to keep these common efforts going throughout those ups and downs in the political character of our relationship. I think ultimately that is a reflection of the fact that both countries see a common interest, a self-interest in both cases in reducing the nuclear danger and in eliminating some of these costly and dangerous systems. Chemical weapons is another area where we are cooperating, and both countries have concluded that even maintaining these old stockpiles of chemical weapons is a danger to our society. So it makes sense for us to continue to cooperate in that and other areas, even when we are arguing off and on over other issues. We have managed to avoid linkage of issues across the board, and I think that's in both of our interests. MR. FOUCHEUX: And Moscow once again -- please go ahead in Moscow. Q: Russian Television. A question for Mr. Holum. Are you in any way afraid that the U.S. intention to back out of the ABM Treaty will undermine the nuclear system all over the world? Even the START I, START II treaties, they stipulate that the ABM Treaty will be abided by in the forum that it was concluded in originally. Thank you. AMB. HOLUM: Thank you. We've made clear, and the president has repeatedly said that the -- and agreed -- that the ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability. And we have no intention of withdrawing from that treaty. What we are trying to do is work cooperatively with our Russian partner to negotiate modest amendments to the treaty that would permit deployment of a national missile defense that would not threaten Russia's deterrent, that wouldn't have any significant capability against Russia, but would allow both countries to deploy modest national missile defense systems to protect us against the rogue state threat. But no decision has been made even on deployment of a U.S. national missile defense. As the president has said, that ultimate decision will depend on cost, it will depend on the threat, it will depend on the technical feasibility of the system, and it will depend on the status of our arms control negotiations. Pursuant to the agreement of our two presidents in Bonn in June, we have had several rounds of discussions with our Russian colleagues on this question, on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty, as well as on how we would approach the START III, the further negotiations to reduce strategic offensive arms. I can't report that those discussions have been successful, but I think we have laid an information base and are at least understanding each other's positions better. But I want to underscore again that our intention and our very strong interest is to approach this problem in a cooperative way, to do it through mutually agreed adjustments, modest adjustments to the ABM Treaty, and also to approach the threat from rogue states in a cooperative way in terms of the operations of any national missile defense programs. Q: Another question from the Russian Public Television. You just said that make certain modifications to the ABM Treaty and this will not do any serious harm. But suppose Russia does not agree to such modifications in the ABM Treaty? Such moods actually do exist currently in Russia. No way would we allow for changing this ABM Treaty. The U.S. press many times has run articles to the effect that the U.S. has a moral right to withdraw from this ABM Treaty in order to implement its goals. Don't you think that this can engender a new arms race? Russia of course in the economic sense is not fully capable to have a full-blown arms race and to respond in the ABM sense to the United States, but Russia as an adequate response can continue to develop its TOPOL (ph) weapons, its offensive capabilities, so this can push Russia towards developing its offensive capability and delivery systems for MIRVs and so forth, because Russia would not be able to set up its own ABM. Don't you think that currently we are faced with a huge threat from this arms race? Thank you. AMB. HOLUM: I think a renewed arms race would be unfortunate. But I also don't think it's either in prospect or would be called for by the circumstances. Remember that the -- as you know, the ABM Treaty does contain a supreme national interests clause that allows either country to withdraw from the treaty upon six months' notice. But what we are trying very hard to do, and what I certainly intend to do, is to devote all the effort I can, and I hope we will have the same -- I am sure we will have the same involvement from our Russian colleagues -- to avoid having that question ever come up, because again the kind of system we are talking about does not defeat the object and purpose of the ABM Treaty. The contributions of the treaty to strategic stability can be preserved if the treaty is amended in a very limited way to allow a limited defense that wouldn't interfere with Russia's deterrent. Now, what I would argue very strongly is that far from weakening the treaty or undercutting the treaty the amendments that we are going to be talking about in negotiations would actually strengthen the treaty, because they demonstrate that this treaty that was negotiated in 1972 can be adjusted, can be modified to account for new realities, for threats that weren't contemplated at the time the treaty was negotiated. It seems to me it is both of our interests, recognizing the value of the treaty, to put our best efforts into trying to preserve those benefits, not by putting up a brick wall against any adjustments, not by keeping the treaty frozen in time, but by making clear that the treaty is flexible enough to accommodate changes in the strategic environment. That's what we are trying to do in these negotiations. Q: Mr. Holum, Interfax Agency. Russian press has published reports that you the United States suggested to Moscow -- proposed certain confidential concessions. I don't know what they are about -- in exchange for Russia's giving up its highly negative stance on the ABM Treaty. Can you clarify what concessions could they be talking about? Thank you. AMB. HOLUM: I don't know what they are talking about, if they are talking about concessions from our negotiating position. What we've determined from the beginning of this process is that we wouldn't try to play negotiating games with Russia, that we wouldn't come in and jack up our negotiating position in order to be able to give away concessions later on in the process. We came in basically saying, Here's the threat, here are the limited kinds of responses we think are warranted, and the modest adjustments to the treaty that would be necessary to allow them. But without, and being very straightforward, without building in concessions. So I don't know what concessions that might be referring to. Perhaps it relates to the fact that we have discussed in the context of these negotiations possible other cooperative measures with Russia that would make Russia, as well as the United States, more secure against the growing threat of missiles from rogue states, keeping in mind that Russia is much closer to Iran, to North Korea, to the places where missile and weapons of mass destruction capabilities might be combined in the near future. So Russia also has an interest in being able to protect itself against those capabilities. And so we've talked about things like shared early warning, other kinds of steps, help on radar systems, that would make Russia, as well as the United States, more secure against these dangers. That underscores again the way we are looking at this as a cooperative enterprise, both in negotiating adjustments to the treaty rather than walking away from it, and in working on the kinds of defenses that the two countries can share. ................ Q: Voice of Ukraine newspaper. Madeleine Albright has stated that the CTBT Treaty will be reintroduced to the Senate at a time that is more appropriate. Is that before the presidential election or after? And what will be the future fate of this treaty? Will it be rejected by the Senate again? And maybe Democrats will not win the election. Thank you. MR. WOLF: I got part of that question, and I'll try to answer the part that I heard. The decision on the ABM Treaty and whether to go ahead with deployment of this limited national missile defense system that Mr. Holum has talked about, that decision is due to be made in June, and I don't believe there is any likelihood that that decision will be made at an earlier date. I'm sorry, beyond that I did not catch the rest of the question. ............. MR. FOUCHEUX: Okay, thank you in Prague. Let's return once again to Moscow -- more questions in Moscow. Go ahead please. Q: Good afternoon, Russian Information Agency, Novistye. Mr. Wolf, in the opinion of many foreign and Russian experts, Pakistan, India, and even more so North Korea, in no time soon will be able to set up delivery systems that would be able to reach the territory of the United States or parts of Russia. Just simply they are still using oxen to harvest. And the non-ratification by the Senate of the CTBT treaty and U.S. attempts to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and to start setting up a national nuclear defense is viewed by those experts as active lobbying on behalf of the military industrial complex of the United States within the Senate and within the administration. Could you comment, refute or confirm or just say anything on this issue? Thank you. MR. WOLF: Certainly there is no effort to create a -- shall we say an impenetrable shield that would allow the United States to live blithely under this shield and ignore the rest of the world. That is not what is intended. And indeed as Ambassador Holum made clear, the shield that is contemplated, the national missile defense that we have in mind, would address a modest threat such as that that could be posed by North Korea for example. It would not be adequate to address a threat such as that posed by the Russian missile forces. So clearly there is no way that in that context that one can withdraw from nuclear arms control agreements. We are, as John Holum indicated, actively engaged with Russia in a variety of places in addition to the START III negotiations, to try to collectively work on reducing the nuclear threat. And we will continue to be actively engaged. ................. MR. FOUCHEUX: All right, let's return to Kiev once again. Go ahead in Kiev. Q: In 1992 Russia and the United States talked about setting up a global ABM system. Are they still thinking about, and involving Ukraine's and other European countries' potential to this system? Thank you. MR. WOLF: Could you -- I didn't quite catch the question I am afraid. MR. FOUCHEUX: He was talking about the agreement in 1992 between Russia and the U.S. to set up a global ABM system. Would that continued, and would it involve other countries such as Ukraine? MR. WOLF: I am afraid I don't know of any such plan to create a global system. We certainly have talked with Russia about an early-warning system, so that if there were a missile launch information would be conveyed to the Russian authorities if we picked it up for example, telling them precisely what the launch was; or even better, perhaps providing advance notification of launches before they occur, so there is no misunderstanding with respect to what is happening. Presumably under this approach we would also receive similar warning from Russia: if they were to engage in a launch, they would provide advance notification. These negotiations have been going on for some time now and I believe they are close to agreement. Similarly, because of concerns about the Y2K issue, there is a plan in place that has been negotiated to provide greater assurance to both Russia and the United States during the transition into the year 2000, and this would include the presence of Russian military at U.S. early-warning sites, such as the one out in Colorado. But I am afraid with respect to any global ABM approach, I am not familiar with that. MR. FOUCHEUX: And we go once again to Moscow. Please go ahead again in Moscow. Q: Russian Public Television. Mr. Wolf, as it is known, a final decision about deploying an ABM system will be taken by the Clinton administration June of next year. Russia takes a very negative approach to those plans. Under what conditions can the U.S. give up on setting up and creating such a system? Thank you. MR. WOLF: Well, as Ambassador Holum indicated, there are four factors that would go into a decision with respect to whether to deploy or not: cost, the threat, technical feasibility, and the status of the negotiations between the United States and Russia. I think it would be premature to speculate as precisely which one of those factors would have to be out of alignment as it were for the United States to give up with a system. Certainly if the remaining tests that are to be conducted of the system that is being contemplated go well, I am sure that will add increased inducement to go ahead with the system. But at this point I could not conjecture what circumstances would persuade us or persuade the administration not to proceed with this system. MR. FOUCHEUX: Mr. Wolf, we were happy to have both you and the ambassador on our program today. We are about to close up. We have about a minute and a half to go. I wonder if you would have any closing comments for our guests as well. MR. WOLF: The only comment I would make would be to emphasize that the United States, despite the setback of the CTBT vote, has no expectation of withdrawing from the world. I was recently in New York last week for three or four days talking with colleagues, and certainly there was a real concern that, number one, the United States was abandoning nuclear arms control efforts; and, number two, perhaps even abandoning multilateral fora such as the United Nations. All I can say is nothing could be further from the truth. More and more it is recognized in the United States that our security is inherently that of the security of the rest of the world, and that the non-proliferation effort must in fact be a global effort. This is not something that we can do on our own. We must work with others if we are to keep the nuclear genie from spreading to other countries. Thank you. MR. FOUCHEUX: Thank you very much, Norm Wolf, senior advisor and chief negotiator of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thank you very much for being with us today. Thanks as well to your colleague, Mr. John Holum, senior adviser for arms control and international security affairs, who as you know was with us earlier in the program. And we have a big thanks as well to all of our participants in Prague, Kiev and Moscow, as well as our entire international audience of Worldnet. We thank you very much for watching. Have a good day. END (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)