The White House Briefing Room
January 21, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY ROBERT BELL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
1:34 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release January 21, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY
ROBERT BELL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL
The Briefing Room
1:34 P.M. EST
Q Has there been any response yet from Yeltsin?
MR. BELL: Helen, if I could just begin with a
statement, then I'll ask you to pose the first question, please.
It's related to the ABM treaty, Sam.
For the last three years, the United States has been
committed to the development, by the year 2000, of a limited national
missile defense system, that is being designed primarily to counter
emerging rogue state missile threats. Now, I say "for the last three
years" because it was in April of 1996 that then-Secretary of Defense
Perry made the decision to upgrade our national missile defense
research efforts from a technology-demonstration status to what we
have called a deployment-readiness status.
Yesterday, Secretary Cohen announced a restructuring of
this program that would orient the developmental efforts towards
fielding the system in the year 2005, instead of 2003 as previously
envisioned, assuming -- assuming -- a go-ahead deployment decision
were to be made in the summer of the year 2000.
I want to emphasize this point: No decision has been
taken on whether to proceed with deployment. A decision on whether
to deploy a limited national missile defense will not be made, as I
said, until the year 2000 or later.
The Secretary also confirmed yesterday that, when the
President's next six-year budget for the Pentagon is presented to
Congress in a few weeks, it will include funds that would be
necessary -- should we later decide to deploy this limited national
missile defense system. The amount added to the President's budget
for fiscal years 1999 through 2005 to cover the contingency that we
decide on deployment amounts to nearly $7 billion. But none of the
deployment dollars that are being added are in the fiscal year 1999
or fiscal year 2000 budget years.
Again, no decision has been taken on whether to proceed
with deployment. A decision on whether to deploy will not be made
until the year 2000 or later, at which point we will again assess our
evaluation of the threat, review the program in terms of its
technology and its maturity and program risk as of that date,
assessing flight tests that we hope to have conducted by that date,
and further refine our cost estimate.
Now, adding this money, then, does not represent a
change in policy. Rather, we are adding this money to protect the
deployment option in the event a decision is made in the year 2000 or
later to field this system.
I would also emphasize that all issues involving the
national missile defense program must, of course, be addressed within
the context of the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty remains, in the view
of this administration, a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the
United States is committed to continued efforts to strengthen the
treaty and enhance its viability and effectiveness. Secretary Cohen
underscored yesterday that he believes it's in our overall interests
to maintain the treaty, and that the treaty is important to
maintaining the limitations on offensive missiles that are contained
in the START Treaties.
Quoting him: "To the extent there is no ABM Treaty,
then, certainly Russia or other countries would feel free to develop
as many offensive weapons as they wanted, which would then set in
motion a comparable dynamic to offset that with more missiles here.
In short, as Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at
the 1997 Helsinki Summit, the ABM Treaty is of fundamental
significance to realizing our strategic arms reduction objectives
under the START II and START III treaties. Now, in this regard, it
has been our longstanding policy to conduct activities related to the
development -- the development -- of this limited system in full
compliance with the ABM Treaty, and senior DOD officials have
repeatedly and recently testified to Congress that the program is in
complete and strict compliance with the Treaty.
Finally, with regard to the option, the possibility of
actually fielding this system should that decision be taken, we have
said many times before that deployment may or may not require
modifications to the Treaty. If deployment required modifications,
we would, in good faith, seek agreement on the needed amendments.
We've not made a proposal to negotiate ABM amendments as some have
reported because, as Secretary Cohen made clear yesterday, we have
not yet made determinations as to what specific amendments might be
required to accommodate the various options that are being considered
in the Pentagon with respect to a final architecture for this
defensive system.
Q Could you give us an example of --
Q But -- can I say "but"? But Cohen also pointed out
that we would withdraw -- probably would withdraw if Russia doesn't
go along.
MR. BELL: Well, I think it's important to be clear on
exactly what the Secretary said. The Secretary did not threaten to
withdraw from the treaty as has been reported; the Secretary merely
noted that the ABM Treaty, as in the case with every arms control
treaty, contains a clause that gives that option.
Q Well, my follow-up is, are these -- I mean,
Albright yesterday or today said that we have the nuclear situation
under control with North Korea. I mean, what are we really worried
about?
MR. BELL: We are concerned with the recent accelerated
trends in the threat, particularly with regard to long-range
missiles. There has been a real and growing threat for some time
with respect to shorter and theater-range missiles against which
we're also developing and in some cases deploying now very
sophisticated theater missile defenses.
What has changed over the last six or seven months has
been an acceleration in the threat with respect to the programs that
various rogue states, including North Korea and Iran have in the
category of long-range missiles -- missiles that have the
potential to reach our homeland if launched.
Now, what the Secretary said yesterday as well as the
other officials who testified in the Pentagon is that we now expect,
our assumption is that those trend lines, by the time we get to the
point where we will address a deployment decision for the first time
at the earliest is 18 months from now, our expectation is that we
will conclude, then, that this threat criterion that we've been
talking about for two years now has been met. But we will see when
we get there, and we don't need to decide that today.
Q Secretary Albright's trip, is she going to discuss
this with the people she sees on her trip?
MR. BELL: Certainly.
Q In what sense? The same way you've just explained
it, or how?
MR. BELL: Well, I imagine the Russians will have a
number of questions of their own. We have been in touch with their
government at various levels, almost every level, over the last week
or so, as has been our practice throughout the development of this
limited national missile defense option.
Q Tell us what their initial reaction is.
MR. BELL: The Russian government is wary of changes in
the ABM Treaty that could be construed to constitute a threat to
their strategic deterrent, that they would deem to have the actual or
potential capability to counter their strategic forces. We have been
very clear in all our discussions with the Russian government that
that is not the design or intention of this limited national missile
defense program.
This program is aimed at providing us with the
capability of defending the American people against a rogue state
that acquires, either through an indigenous development program or an
outright sale or transfer, a handful, at the most, of long-range
missiles on top of which they could equip either chemical or
biological, or in the worst case, nuclear weapons.
Q Are you saying that the object, then, of a possible
decision to deploy would be to deploy the type of system that could
deter rogue state missiles but would not deter a Russian missile
attack?
MR. BELL: The word "deterrence" is important, Sam. We
would hope that any state, rogue or otherwise, that contemplated
attacking our homeland with long-range missiles would be deterred not
only by the prospect of a defense in being if we decide to deploy
this NND option, but also deterred from doing so by the certitude of
what our reaction would be with our considerable military
capabilities against the state itself. But in the case of Russia,
there is no requirement that's been identified by the Joint Staff in
this planning process that we are working against that envisions a
defense so robust that it would provide a capability to negate
Russia's strategic force.
Q A question -- you say "so robust" -- is that the
key? In other words, we could deploy a system which would be
sufficiently strong to take out a North Korean missile, but could be
overcome by Russian attack?
MR. BELL: It operates on two levels. First, there is
an issue of numbers. Fundamentally, you would have to have a very
large number of interceptors deployed to have any fighting chance, if
you will, of negating the Russian strategic force. A subordinate
question is whether an individual missile -- for
example, if an individual Russian, or for that matter Chinese ICBM
was launched by accident or inadvertence, whether this system in a
technical sense would have the capability to intercept a very
sophisticated missile that had, for example, multiple warheads or
penetration devices to help those warheads get through.
We have tried in many ways to make sure, particularly in
the case of Russia, that we remove that threat of an accidental or an
unauthorized launch of even a single missile, for example through the
detargeting agreement. But the design of this system is primarily
aimed at the capability to defeat a rogue state that acquires a very
small number of ICBMs equipped with weapons of mass destruction
warheads, that that state might presumably try to use for nuclear or
attack blackmail purposes in some regional crisis.
Q Bob, did you say what the status is of any of
Russian ABM program? Are they still working on anything now? And
secondly, there have been proposals over the last few years, feelers
put out by the Russians talking about a collaborative effort with the
United States on some kind of a limited system, and it seems like
these proposals, which I think there was something only a few months
ago to this extent, have really not met much of a response from the
U.S. side -- at the point there was no concern, where ABM systems
were not at all discussed, this is understood. But now that the
issue is coming up again, is there any consideration of some kind of
a proposal -- collaboration to also assure the Russians that this is
not directed against them?
MR. BELL: I think you raise two very important points.
The first is that it is important to recognize that the government of
Russia has maintained an ABM system around Moscow throughout the
period following the end of the Cold War; in fact, the ABM limited
defense of Moscow that's deployed around that city, that capital
city, is now in its fourth generation.
Q Which is allowed under the treaty.
MR. BELL: It is permitted under the treaty. The ABM
treaty, as Sam correctly points out, does not prohibit limited ABM
systems, it strictly regulates the numbers and locations of those
defenses. But this is not a case in which Russia, not only during
the era of the Cold War as the Soviet Union, but since the end of the
Cold War, has foresworn limited ABM defenses of its capitol, it has
maintained and upgraded those system over the years.
With respect to collaborative efforts, we work very hard
to try to identify opportunities to cooperate with Russia, not only
at the level of theater missile defenses -- where we've done joint
exercises, proposing missile-data-warning sharing to allow them to
use the information we have about incoming threats that their TMDs
could counter. But actually planning to field, side by side, Russian
and American TMD systems, operated by our respective forces, to get
some sense of the interoperability of those systems, were we
operating together in some coalition warfare situation.
But even at the national missile defense level, I think
it's important to recognize that there has been a program of
collaboration with the Russians. In fact, we are now waiting -- the
test was scrubbed yesterday, and today as well, because of weather --
but we have a major exercise planned, to be launched our of Alaska,
now scheduled for tomorrow morning, about dawn, that involves
collaboration between Johns Hopkins Advanced Physics Laboratory in
Baltimore and the Russian Academy of Science, where they're going to
actually explode a plasma generator in the ionosphere -- with Russian
participation -- to help test this issue of being able to
discriminate warheads as they enter the atmosphere.
So this is a case where we have contracts with Russia,
with the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Ballistic Missile
Defense Office is pursuing an important collaborative program.
Q Between India and Pakistan, first it was missile
testing, then nuclear testing, and now, again, Pakistan is ready to
test another missile, and then India will follow. So what do -- the
solution?
MR. BELL: Well, I'm going to refer that question to the
State Department and Jamie Rubin. As you know, the Deputy Secretary
of State, Strobe Talbott, has engaged in a series of visits, both to
Islamabad and to New Delhi. Part of our agenda is to urge restraint
on the part of both parties with regard to further missile tests and
further deployments, not to mention any further nuclear test or
weaponization of nuclear capabilities that both countries have
demonstrated to date.
But I can't give you an update on the status of those
talks. You'd be better served by going to State for that question.
Q Has there been any one issue or event that has
brought this to the fore? Bob Dole, for years, and the Republicans
have said that we needed this, and the administration hasn't moved on
it as fast, but was it the North Korean nuclear test precisely? Or
was it some other incident in the world that made you think that this
was, now, a credible threat, and would be?
MR. BELL: First, let me remind you as I said in the
opening that it was three years ago, April in 1996, that we made the
deliberate decision to upgrade our NMD effort from a technology
program to what we intentionally called a deployment readiness
program. Now, three years ago we said that we were going to try to
get our NMD option moved to the point where it would be available for
deployment if we deemed the threat warranted.
Now, what's changed in the last number of months going
back, let's say to last summer, I think the Rumsfeld Commission made
a very important contribution in terms of a peer review of how our
intelligence community was assessing the possibility of a faster than
predicted emergence of the threat, particularly with foreign states
transferring technology know-how or equipment. There was the fact of
the North Korean three-stage test that tried but failed to put a
satellite in orbit, but demonstrated at least a rudimentary technical
capability to move a missile, the third stage of that missile, to
ranges that began to come into a zone that encompassed Hawaii, for
example.
But finally, I would just note, that we have been saying
for over two years that we had a three-plus-three program in the
first three, if you will, came due in the summer of 2000. We have
just finished putting together our budget proposal for fiscal year
2000. So the other thing that's changed is that that bill has come
due, if you will, in terms of moving another year towards that
milepost that we had identified back in 1996 for how we wanted to
conduct the program.
That said, I need to emphasize again that the money is
being put in the budget to protect the contingency, to protect the
option of deploying if we conclude, at the earliest in the summer of
the year 2000, that this system is ready in terms of technology and
technical risk; that it's costs are under control; and again taking
another check on where the threat has moved from now to the summer of
2000, the urgency of the threat as of that decision point.
Q A nation being able to launch rockets is one thing,
but how many rogue states do we know that have or are close to
getting to the intercontinental ballistic missile type which will be
required, which this system would defend against --
MR. BELL: The reality is that the threat becomes real
when one state now gets -- or just based on the pattern of
proliferation we've seen -- and this, I believe, was just one of the
real contributions that the Rumsfeld Commission made to our
appreciation of the problem.
North Korea is exporting its missile capabilities. They
are quite blatant about their intentions in that regard. They see it
as not only something that no one has any business talking to them
about, though we do continue to press our agenda for missile
restraint with them in the talks, but beyond that they see it as a
major source of export earnings. We cannot assume that if North
Korea perfects a three-stage ICBM capable of striking the American
homeland with a meaningful military warhead, particularly one that
has weapons of mass destruction capability, that North Korea will not
seek to sell that capability to other states.
Q Basically the difference then between this and Star
Wars is essentially anticipating the volume of --
MR. BELL: Well, this is not Star Wars. Let me be very
clear. I've been present at the creation of this saga going back to
1983. Remember the day that the Pentagon testified before the Senate
Arms Control Committee in 1983, in April, that we had no requirement
for a more robust missile defense program. And the next day
President Reagan gave a Start Wars speech. President Reagan was
talking about an extremely capable and robust space-based total
shield defense, one that would be capable of stopping a determined
attack from the Soviet Union in excess of the START I levels. This
was before START I had been completed. In other words, he was
projecting the vision of a defense that could stop tens of thousands
of incoming warheads from a determined adversary like the Soviet
Union.
This is an extremely limited defense that's designed
primarily, as I said, to be able to provide real defense against a
rogue state that gets a handful, at the most, of missiles that it
tries to blackmail us with or actually use against us in a crisis.
And there's a considerable difference, not only land-based in terms
of the architecture, which presents much better prospects of being
able to accommodate the ABM Treaty to meet this requirement -- if we
determine that's necessary, as opposed to space-based, which I think
by anyone's calculation meant the ABM Treaty would be at a point of
history in terms of any way you could imagine such a set of changes
in the treat to accommodate that system.
Q Is there no way, Bob, to penetrate their computers
and somehow countermand the orders from their computer electronically
without going through all of this?
MR. BELL: Well, there are a lot of options available in
any crisis if you feel that you're being threatened by, or someone's
attempting to blackmail you with, any military capability, whether
it's a missile or any other military system. But you still owe it to
yourself -- it's just a matter of simple prudence -- to provide as
wide a range of options as you can to deal with that crisis. You
don't want to reduce yourself to simply a pre-emption option to take
the threat away.
That doesn't mean, though, that you decide to deploy
something that is not going to work. It doesn't do your national
security any good to deploy a system that hasn't proven it will work.
Q Bob, are you talking about a limited NMD option?
What's the difference, then, between that and the theater
high-altitude systems that the U.S. has already been --
MR. BELL: The THAAD system -- Theater High-Altitude
Area Defense, THAAD -- the THAAD theater missile defense system, that
has been under development but has undergone a series of setbacks in
its test program, is a TMD, a theater missile defense system, for
purposes of the ABM treaty, or, for that matter, for purposes of our
regional defense strategy. We would use THAAD, for example, to
deploy with a force in the Gulf, if we were engaged in a war with
Iraq, or in Korea, if we were in hostilities on the peninsula.
But the THAAD system has been formally assessed and
certified to Congress as not having a technical capability to
intercept an incoming ICBM warhead, and thus, for purposes of this
demarcation, or distinguishing, for purposes of the treaty, between
an ABM that is restricted, and TMDs that are unrestricted, we have
formally reported to Congress that the THAAD system is not an ABM and
is therefore not captured, if you will, by the terms of the treaty.
Q Is that distinction because of the range of the
THAAD system or other specifications?
MR. BELL: Capability is a function, essentially, of the
inter-relationship between the interceptor missile speed -- the
faster, the more capable, on the one hand -- and the power of the
radar on the other. With tactical or theater systems, particularly
ones that are mounted on ships, you necessarily have to limit the
power of the radar.
If you take an AMB radar, like the one we built at Grand
Forks back in the '70s and then decommissioned, and put it on a
cruiser, you would get a very capably TMD -- it would also sink the
cruiser because the radar would weigh too much. So there are always
trade-offs here for a tactical system like THAAD that's going to
accompany forces that are in a maneuver warfare situation, where the
radar power is restricted necessarily, and in an AMB system, where
you can build a huge, powerful radar because it's not intended to go
anywhere.
Q Bob, China is still continuing missile technology
to Pakistan and other countries. Is the U.S. doing anything or
having more talks with Chinese? Because they promised in the past
they will not do again, but they are still continuing.
MR. BELL: I'm going to defer that question as well.
Gary Samore, our Senior Director for Nonproliferation, has the
expertise on that subject and I think you ought to go to the source.
Q Is the system you're talking about, is this going
to be based on kinetic weapons, missile-to-missile, or are you going
to be using more exotic technology?
MR. BELL: This is intended and will be a kinetic kill
system. It's not nuclear. It's designed to hit the target and
destroy it through that collision.
COLONEL CROWLEY: Thank you very much.
END 1:59 P.M. EST