QUESTION: Did you give formal or informal
notification of intent to withdraw from the ABM? SECRETARY
POWELL: No, we did
not give formal or informal notification of an intention to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty. But the
President has said repeatedly to President Putin and the Kremlin that we
have to get beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty, and he reinforced
that again to President Putin last night, but he did not give, to answer
your question precisely, either informal or formal notification of an
intent to withdraw.
QUESTION: But was it a talking
point?
SECRETARY
POWELL: The only
talking points that count were the ones that came out of the President
last night. Look, talking
points are prepared for officials all the time, everywhere. I get them all the time. Sometimes I even read them. But what the President said was
that he did not give any formal or informal notification of the United
States intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty under the provisions of
the treaty. But, he
reinforced to President Putin as he has done repeatedly, once again, that
we've got to get beyond the constraints of the ABM Treaty because it keeps
us from doing things that we need to pursue missile defenses.
QUESTION: Do you expect that you will give formal
notification during the summit in Washington, in Crawford?
SECRETARY
POWELL: We have not made a decision on that because, as both
Presidents said last night, both sides are working in earnest to see if
there is a way that we can go forward. That is what we are doing. My colleague, he's flying home
right now, today is Monday?
We'll talk sometime Monday and see how we follow up with our
respective staffs. I'm sure
Mr. Rumsfeld's staff will be doing the same thing. So I cannot tell you where we will
be at Crawford. As Mr. Putin
has said in the past, a unilateral withdrawal from our part is certainly
an option for us, and he acknowledges that that's our option, an option
that's on the table. But as
both Presidents said last night, we are continuing to talk to each other
and pursue a process.
QUESTION: Mr. Putin has said, as he is
apparently telling his own people, that the treaty can stretch and he's
ready to accommodate President Bush on the whole testing program. Does that mean the treaty could
survive this process as he's arguing it should?
SECRETARY
POWELL: I haven't
quite heard him say that.
Although -- but I have had discussions with some Russian colleagues
of mine who suggest we can probably do more testing than we think we can
under the treaty, or the 1997 New York protocol as it is called. We are looking at all of
that. The important point in
all of this, the President will not allow our missile development program
to be constrained artificially by a treaty that he believes no longer
serves a useful purpose in the 21st century.
QUESTION:
(inaudible).
SECRETARY
POWELL: Elaine's
asking if I can give an estimate of the range of times when it will come
in conflict, and I can't. I
really do have to defer on that because I'm really not into the technology
of it all. Nor am I watching
it as closely as I used to in my previous life.
Very often it becomes a
matter of differing groups of lawyers making a legal interpretation of
what the treaty permits you to do and not do. They have their lawyers. We
have our lawyers. The State
Department lawyers all have fascinating debates with the Defense
Department lawyers. That's one of the reasons that we think that this
treaty has outlived its usefulness.
Some of you who have been around as long as Robin remember back in
the eighties, when we used to argue over physical principles, remember
that one, Robin? You were
around then, too, Pat. We
used to have these (inaudible) arguments about physical principles which
can be used which are or not permitted. Those of you who were around that
long will remember that we used to argue over broad versus narrow
interpretations. Remember how
my beloved friends, Cap Weinberger and George Shultz, used to go on about
that month after month after month.
So the treaty, even though it
is really easy to read -- you can read it in just a few moments -- it is
subject to enormous interpretation. That's why we think that it is time to
move beyond it, and we had a long discussion about it last
night.
QUESTION:
President Putin's comments to
the contrary, do you all sense any give on the Russian side, and do you
think that this discussion of drawing down offensive weapons is perhaps a
way to give the Russians an ABM out as working?
SECRETARY
POWELL: What I am
trying to give them an out -- we are trying to persuade them that in this
new -- we are not enemies. We
are all in the 21st century.
There is no Soviet Union.
There is no evil empire.
There is no Iron Curtain. We really do need a basic strategic
framework that involves a number of pieces. One is a significant reduction in
the number of strategic offensive weapons and we expect our colleagues at
the Pentagon will provide the President with a number in the very near
future that will serve as the basis for that part of the framework.
Secondly, moving beyond the
ABM Treaty so that we can develop missile defense, which at the new lower
numbers on both sides will not be a threat to either side. And third, you have to consider
all of the proliferation issues that are involved in this so that we are
not creating other ballistic missile armed nuclear entities that could
upset the balance. So we think -- I would not couch it as we are trying to
give the Russians an out -- we are trying to show
them what we think is the correct way, how to look at it at this
point. To look at this
problem right now.
But as you have heard from
them, repeatedly, and Mr. Putin said it again yesterday in his meeting
with President Jiang Zemin, that they still view the ABM Treaty as one of
the cornerstones of this strategic framework. We think it no longer serves that
role. The Russians have been
forthcoming enough to say yeah, we do realize it is an audible environment
and let's continue to talk about this and let the process continue. That's what we are trying to help
make happen. We are under,
and I don't want to use the word deadline, we are under no constraints
with respect to our thinking. We'll see where we are in three weeks' time
in Crawford.
QUESTION: That's the Russians. Let's talk about the Chinese who
still on missile defense have strong concerns. Can you explain how missile
defense doesn't erode the Chinese deterrent and how any attempt they make
to build up a response to that does not signal an arms race, doesn't set
off an arms race between Pakistan and India?
SECRETARY
POWELL: The Chinese
have always kept a relatively small amount of intercontinental ballistic
missiles and they have never viewed them the same way as the United States
and Soviet Union. The Soviet
Union did during the years of the Cold War where we were constantly
building up. You know, if we
put them in SSBNs, they'd put them in SSBNs. If we moved, they moved. If we had a triad, they had a
triad. It was this
competition. The Chinese were
never a part of that competition in the same way. We tried to have treaties with the
Russians, not the Chinese.
They built a relatively small number of (inaudible) first strike
intercontinental ballistic missiles that had in the theology of this steel
(inaudible). They were not
designed to go after somebody else's nuclear forces to keep those forces
from striking you. They were
designed to go after something of enormous value, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, Seattle, and as long as they could do that, their nuclear forces
were serving their purpose.
It is expected that over time, we would modernize, one would
modernize such a force. Can't
keep an old force around forever.
The Chinese have been working to modernize that force. Modernizing also tends to make it
way more stable and safe (inaudible).
I
have seen nothing to suggest that the Chinese are so concerned about
missiles defense that they are poised for a breakout in the sense that
they would significantly by factors of two, three, four, or five, increase
the numbers of their intercontinental ballistic missiles in order to get
through a shield, not to go to a counter for strategy, but to get through
a shield. We have been
talking to the Chinese (inaudible).
It came up again this trip, but it wasn't a lingering
conversation. Even when I was
here in July and I had a long conversation over the long lunch table with
Foreign Minister Tang, I took him through all what I'm giving you now and
he listened, and they all listened, and when I finished, they said thank
you. So they are taking it
all aboard and I'm sure they are making their calculations and we will try
to give them every assurance that we can that this is not directed against
them. We are directing it
against others in their neighborhood who are pursuing this kind of
capability that we're worried about.
People who are not under what we would consider responsible
leadership, and we will continue to make that case with the Chinese
government. If I were a
Chinese general, I would still have to have one small part of my brain
continuing to look at that capability and wondering no matter what they
say it is for, perhaps it can be a way of defending against my missiles as
well. We will have to see
what they do with this whole calculus, but frankly, they have been rather
subdued about it in recent months in my discussions with the
(inaudible). They listen.
They want to learn more. We send briefers over. But they have been rather
subdued. Yesterday, Jiang
Zemin reaffirmed the ABM Treaty to which he is not a signatory.
QUESTION: But what if you were an Indian
general?
SECRETARY
POWELL: If I was an Indian general, it wouldn't trouble me
because they are really, the Indians and the Pakistanis, are really
concerned about the problems in their neighborhood. I don't think any of
the nations, China, India, Pakisan, in light of this new 21st century
world, view America as the kind of nation they are likely to get into
conflict with. Bu
nonetheless, I can't really speak for an Indian or Pakistani general, or
for that matter, I don't speak for American generals anymore,
either.
QUESTION: Following up in India and Pakistan,
that group of I's and P's, you have another group of I's and P's that are
at each other's throats now.
The tensions rose quite significantly, during your time away next
week in both places. How do
you see that calming down, if you do, and what's the effect of that on the
coalition?
SECRETARY
POWELL: You know,
this was not a good week in the Middle East. It started out as a promising
week. The first day was the
most promising day I had seen in many months with the Israelis opening up
some crossing sites, pulling back their forces from Hebron or a number of
other places. You may recall Mr. Sharon, also that same day, once again,
indicated in due course the existence of a Palestinian state. We had
security meetings going on (inaudible) getting better.
So for the first time in a
long time, I was seeing some progress toward the Mitchell plan and I was
very encouraged. But the very
next day, we had a terrorist attack, killed a minister who had just left
government. He would have
been out of the government in another hour and he left the government
because Mr. Sharon had been asking actions that were starting to move in a
direction of trying to get the process going. So it could not have been a more
tragic incident as a personal matter of course for the minister and his
family, but for the region.
So, as a result, we had a deterioration all week long with the
Israelis feeling the need to go back into a number of these Zone A cities
and towns and making demands on the Palestinians with respect to arresting
the perpetrators. Mr. Arafat
is trying to find the perpetrators.
New demands have been placed
on the table. I spent most of
yesterday working on this. I spoke to Prime Minister Sharon. I spoke to Mr. Arafat, Foreign
Minister Maher, King Abdullah, Igor Ivan, of course, maybe a couple of
others that Richard can get to you.
And trying to see, not forget where we have been a week
before.
Mr. Sharon had indicated he
felt it absolutely necessary to go in and arrest those who are planning
terror and he did not want to remain in those zones and would be coming
out as soon as he could. I
encouraged him to exercise all the restraint that he could because we have
to think about the day after.
I also encouraged Chairman Arafat to do all he could in order to
arrest those who are responsible for this latest act of terror and to
continue to do all that he could to reduce the violence to hopefully zero,
the lowest level possible. So
it was not a great four days. So far today, there's been violence but it
hasn't been as bad as yesterday. We will see where we are tomorrow. It's a day by day thing, I regret
to say.
QUESTION: Did the Palestinian party just outlaw the
armed group of the PFLP?
SECRETARY
POWELL: I heard they were getting ready to do that, and I think
that is a good move. I think
the (inaudible) have given instructions to his various organizations to
implement a cease-fire. If
they don't follow his instructions and violate that, it's a challenge to
his authority. I'm glad to
see that he's responding to that challenge.
QUESTION:
(inaudible)
SECRETARY
POWELL: I would hope
that both sides would make whatever reciprocal moves they can in order to
reduce tension. As I said a moment ago, Mr. Sharon said he does not want
to stay into these occupied areas, so as the violence is ended in those
areas, in the Zone A areas he went into(inaudible). As soon as the violence has gone
down and he has done whatever arresting he planned to do, he wants to come
back out. He also gave me his
assurance that he is still committed to the Mitchell committee
process. I look forward to my
conversations with Foreign Minister Peres. I can't give you a specific
yes, if they do that, they should do that. I can just give you a general, I
hope both sides will look for every opportunity to go back down the ladder
of escalation and try to do everything they can to reduce tensions.
QUESTION:
(inaudible)
SECRETARY
POWELL: I do that; I
do that almost every day. I
do it in a way, in different ways, in different methods, in different
channels, and this isn't one of the channels that I want to use
today.
QUESTION: Secretary Powell, I don't
know nearly as much arms control as you do, so please explain to me what
the difference is when you say the Chinese have a small arsenal that's
meant to go after all the cities you mentioned. No, I know the Chinese have said
that in the past. So what is the difference between a small Chinese
arsenal that targets American cities and a rogue state, whether it be
North Korea, Iraq or Iran, that has a small arsenal? How is our missile defense system
not something that might spark China to build in a more expansive way than
they might have otherwise?
SECRETARY
POWELL: It is a
possibility, as I tried to answer Bill's question. I'm sure part of their calculus,
they wonder if that is appropriate.
But I think they are all speculating to see how our program
develops and make a judgment as to whether or not they still feel secure
with the level they have now and the strategy they have now. I hope as they see our
program develop, and see how it is being developed against certain rather
specific kinds of threats, very limited in nature, they will not find the
need to explode the size of their arsenal. I don't think they'll find such a
need or see such a need.
QUESTION:
While we were refueling, my desk said that Javier Solana had come out and
said he hoped that the Afghan King would soon be able to form a new
government. You just spoke
with him. Did he say anything that specific that the former king would be
able to form a new government?
That sounded a little odd to me. I know that we're never saying
that we have an (inaudible) and the Afghans have to choose. Do you know whether or not -- have
you heard?
SECRETARY
POWELL: I talked to Javier yesterday as he was getting ready to
travel. He is heading to the Middle East. We talked about Afghanistan, in
general terms, about the need for a new government to be considered and
work to be done to put one together in a post-Taliban regime to be
ready. I don't think we've
gone so far so to say that it is the king that would be the head of this
country. I think we all
recognize that the king has unique authority and unique ability to perhaps
convene the different parties (inaudible).
QUESTION:
(inaudible)
SECRETARY
POWELL: Until I hear
what he says, until I've heard what he's said and see it myself, I don't
think that I would wish to characterize it as strange.
QUESTION: You've talked about trying to go to
the next stage -- building, reconstruction, humanitarian aid and so
forth. Now that you've got
this strategy in place, can you tell us about what you're going to be
doing about that? And,
secondly, on the force that may be going in, there are two very different
kinds of ideas - an Islamic force, and a UN force. Can you tell us?
SECRETARY
POWELL: On the first question, what I will be doing this week is
getting a report from Richard Haass, who had good discussions last week,
not only on the political piece of it, but also some of the ideas with
respect to rebuilding. Many
of the APEC nations or APEC economies, as they euphemistically prefer to
call them, were very interested in participating in the reconstruction
effort. I think there will be
solid support for that, and a number of them said, and I think it was
Prime Minister Koizumi said at one point, this is not a country that needs
to have its industry rebuilt.
It isn't a huge Marshall Plan kind of investment. We are talking about an agrarian
society, some extracted industries, some oil and gas potential, but fairly
modest investment could do wonders, and we're looking at that. I think that part will fall into
place fairly quickly once there is stability. There seems to be a solid
understanding within the coalition, where we say APEC, NATO, EU and OIC,
that we all have to get together to help with this rebuilding,
reconstruction, whatever one chooses to call it.
On the military force, I
don't have the view on it, but the alternatives are pretty
straightforward. You can put
in something under Blue Helmet, a UN force, or you can try to assemble
willing nations who might put in a force, not necessarily under the UN but
will work with whatever UN presence is in the region. That is another way to do it.
Another alternative is, just
to exhaust them all, is to just see if you can rapidly put together an
Afghan force. That seems to be tricky until you've established some form
of government and some form of understanding among the various groupings
as to how they will share power and authority before you can really put an
army together or a police establishment in place.
So right now, it is not that
there is a fight going in. It's that we are trying to debate it, trying to
figure out what the right answer is.
Some reporting last week suggested that we were at odds with Mr.
Brahimi in the UN. I think a
better way to characterize it is that we're looking at alternatives to see
what would be best supported.
QUESTION: Do you think your trip to
Pakistan and India did more than just buy time for the war on
terrorism? Given India's
continued deep mistrust of Musharraf, how would you assess the stability
of Musharraf as a leader and both the relations between India and Pakistan
in general?
SECRETARY
POWELL: I found
President Musharraf to be very much in charge. I think he has a very good
understanding of the situation that he's in, and he has good support for
the decisions that his government has taken. He has also popular discontent
with respect to the military actions in Afghanistan and, as he said
several times during our press conference, he would like to see those
actions go on for as short of a period as possible. So would we all. But it is more important to make
sure that we accomplish the mission, and he also understands that. So I found him to be in secure
position. But nevertheless,
we are trying to do whatever we can to help him with respect to economic
aid, which is what he wanted more than anything else. He emblazoned two words on me,
which I think that I have used, which is debt relief, so we're going to
try to get him all the assistance we can.
Obviously, there's tension
between India and Pakistan still and that flared up on my last night in
Pakistan on my way to India the next morning when we saw the firing over
the line of control. At the
same time, I think both sides are realizing, even though this is a very
difficult issue for them, they can't let it get out of control. The stakes are too high. Both
sides are committed to the coalition. Both sides are helping the United
States and other coalition members.
Both sides are working with us on a future for Afghanistan, and
both sides realize that for peace and stability in their part of the
world, they've got to get this right. So I sense that even though
there's tension, I understand that they have to act with enormous
restraint. Both sides said
that they are anxious to get a dialogue started. They are having a little
difficulty getting that dialogue started. I will try to be helpful in that
regard. I think they are both
committed to the campaign against terrorism, and I was pretty satisfied
with the trip.
[End]