07 April 2000
The United States is still committed to arms control as part of its security policy, says President's Senior Advisor for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Security Affairs John Holum. In an April 5 Worldnet Dialogue with Sydney and Canberra, the presidential advisor stressed the point that "despite the setback of the Senate's failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," the Clinton Administration still "believes in and relies upon arms control as a central element in our international security policy." On the issue of whether the United States should proceed with a national missile defense (NMD), Holum stressed that "the decision to proceed with national missile defense has not yet been made" by President Clinton. If President Clinton does decide to move forward with NMD, Holum said, the United States would "deploy no more than 100 interceptors in Alaska, and one ABM radar, and then some upgrades of existing early warning radars -- five of them." The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, Holum said, "already provides for 100 interceptors. They can be in a regional defense as opposed to a national defense." However, Holum added, "they do require an amendment to the treaty." Beijing, Holum conceded, is "vocally and actively opposed to any adjustment to the ABM Treaty, and to any U.S. deployment of a national missile defense." While the United States can make the case to Russia that the proposed NMD "would not have any capability against their strategic forces," Holum said, "that case is harder to make with respect to China." But, Holum added, the United States can show China that the proposed system "is not aimed against them, that we have no interest in an arms race with China." China's primary concern, he suggested, whether it is looking at "national missile defense, theater missile defense, or other aspects of our relationship, is Taiwan." "To the extent that the Taiwan issue is more difficult, the national missile defense will loom larger as a complication in our relationship. To the extent that the Taiwan relationship can be restored to a more stable path, then I think NMD won't be that complicated," he said. ............. Following is a transcript of the program: (begin transcript) WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF BROADCAST SERVICES GUEST: John Holum, President's Senior Advisor for Arms Control, Non-Proliferation and Security Affairs TOPIC: Non-Proliferation Issues POSTS: Canberra, Sydney HOST: Ken Richards DATE: April 5, 2000 ........................... MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Sydney. Let's now return to Canberra for more questions. Please go ahead, Canberra. Q: Mr. Holum, my name is Pete Van Ness (ph). I am from the Contemporary China Center at Australian National University. I'd like to ask you about the implications of the ballistic missile defense initiative in the United States for U.S. relations with China, and most particularly for China's participation in arms control agreements. And, if I may, I would like to put it in a little bit of context. We have been following the debate in the United States on the issue of, Is arms control dead? -- for example in Washington Quarterly in winter of this year. And when we look at what's been happening -- for example, your agency being folded into the Department of State, the Senate rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that has been discussed, and now the Clinton administration's efforts to revise very substantially the ABM Treaty in negotiations with Russia -- increasingly people wonder whether the ABM or rather the ballistic missile defense initiative in the United States is really -- whether it's undermine arms control commitments by the United States. With regard to China, it seems to me that through six administrations the effort has been to bring China bit by bit into agreement on the key arms control agreements, and by and large that's been successful. But now with the American commitment to the national missile defense program, plus the theater missile defense program, as you know China is very unhappy about both, and organizations like the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London have confirmed that if the United States goes ahead with a national missile defense program that this would potentially very much undermine the Chinese nuclear deterrent. Obviously they're also concerned about the theater missile defense idea as it relates to Taiwan. I am wondering if you could discuss for us the implications for China of these ballistic missile defense initiatives by the U.S. MR. HOLUM: Yes, thank you. I would like to put the answer also in context, because it's important to note that we are not proposing a substantial revision of the ABM Treaty. I just want to lay that on the table, because here's what we are proposing to do, if the president decides to proceed: to deploy no more than 100 interceptors in Alaska, and one ABM radar, and then some upgrades of existing early warning radars -- five of them. Now, the treaty already provides for 100 interceptors. They can be in a regional defense as opposed to a national defense. So they do require an amendment to the treaty. But we don't regard this as a major alteration of the treaty but rather a very modest one that can take into account new international realities, new potential threats, without undercutting the core purpose of the treaty for strategic stability and permitting continued reductions of offensive forces. And I also want to emphasize the decision to proceed with national missile defense has not yet been made by the president. What he has done, and what we have agreed upon, is on notional architecture that I just described, if the president were to decide to go ahead. And the reason we have made that decision is so we have a basis for negotiating with the Russians. What we are trying to do is to amend the treaty to allow this defense rather than walk away from the treaty. The decision will be based on four criteria -- this is a long way of getting to your question. One is cost, one is threat, one is technology, and the fourth is something we've called the fourth criteria because it's rather broad -- it includes arms control, the strategic environment. It also includes our relationships with our allies, the overall arms control impact, and of course our relationship with China, which is an extremely important relationship. And one of the things we'll do is make sure that when the president approaches this decision some time this summer that he will have before him all of the potential implications for all of those considerations. Now, as to China, it is clearly the case that they are vocally and actively opposed to any adjustment to the ABM Treaty, and to any U.S. deployment of a national missile defense. We can make fairly easily the case to Russia that this system would not have any capability against their strategic forces. That case is harder to make with respect to China. But what we can point out to the Chinese is that this system is not aimed against them, that we have no interest in an arms race with China. My own estimate or calculus is that China's primary concern, whether it looks at national missile defense, theater missile defense, or other aspects of our relationship, is Taiwan. To the extent that the Taiwan issue is more difficult, the national missile defense will loom larger as a complication in our relationship. To the extent that the Taiwan relationship can be restored to a more stable path, then I think NMD won't be that complicated. Remember that China over the course of its entire nuclear experience has not had in place a quick response retaliatory capability. Its limited number of ICBMs are deployed in such a way that they couldn't retaliate promptly were there to be an attack. I don't think China anticipates a first strike by the United States, and hasn't maintained forces to deal with that eventuality. I also believe that it's unlikely that this system would have a significant capability against the forces that China is likely to have deployed in any case, with or without national missile defense, because of its strategic modernization program. But you raise a very important point. This is a complicated set of questions, one that the president will have to weigh very carefully, because it certainly is something the Chinese have been very adamant about. ..................... Q: If I could follow up, isn't there -- as you have discussed these questions with us, I wonder if there isn't a fundamental contradiction between the whole concept of arms control and ballistic missile defenses? I mean, the ballistic missile defenses seem to have their roots in a notion that somehow we are going to be able, or you are going to be able in the United States to be able to defend yourself against any eventuality, whereas arms control is a notion of trying to make a safer world for everybody, and particularly in the presidential election context, and the positions taken by the Bush campaign. At least here some of us get the impression that if Bush is elected president that arms control, if not totally discarded, will be very much secondary to this concern about defending the United States with ballistic missile defenses. MR. HOLUM: Well, I don't want to get into electoral politics, but I do think it's important to see national missile defense in a context that prefers arms control solutions. We have worked very hard -- through the Perry initiative -- to try to curtail North Korea's WMD and missile capabilities. Prevention is our first preference and priority. Arms control is more reliable -- it's certainly much less expensive than defense. And so that is our first preference, and we are not neglecting it, either with respect to North Korea or with respect to Iran, which are the two more immediate or near-term risks of WMD, weapons of mass destruction, and missile, inter-continental range missiles. Now, the way I see missile defense fitting into this is as when arms control doesn't entirely succeed, then what do you do? Well, the first thing we rely on is deterrence. But there are reasons to believe, in the case of a country like North Korea or Iran, that the traditional notions of deterrence might not work. And I'm not thinking here that North Korea would launch an attack on the United States out of the blue. We have an alliance relationship with South Korea. North Korea might believe that if they had a nuclear and missile capability that could wipe out a U.S. city that in an emergency we would be less likely to come to the aid of our ally. So it's a reverse deterrence -- an effort to deter us from living up to our security commitments that we're concerned about. Now, some would argue that if you are in that circumstance you have that concern, why not preempt? Why not attack this capability rather than let it emerge? I don't like that option very much, and I don't think it would be acceptable internationally, although it's something that some would advocate. It seems to me under those circumstances that defending is a reasonable option, so long as you can have some confidence that it will work, that it's affordable, and that it won't upset the arms control and strategic structure that you want to preserve internationally. That's the kind of analysis that we are in the process of going through here. There is nothing inherently negative or evil about defense. If it weren't for the role that the ABM Treaty plays in the arms control process between the United States and Russia in particular, I think people generally would say defense is a good thing. It doesn't threaten anybody except someone who wants to attack you. It doesn't strike anyone or anything except an incoming missile or warhead. But I think so long as we can fit it within the context of a workable security strategy and arms control strategy that defense is something that merits looking very carefully at. .................... Q: Geoffrey Barker (ph) again, Mr. Holum. You said earlier that there was nothing -- I think the terms you used were "negative or evil" about defenses. But why isn't it reasonable to conclude that the development and deployment of TMD or NMD would at least risk starting a new arms race just because countries like China and Russia and possibly others might be moved to develop new offensive weapons capable of penetrating the limited shield envisaged by the United States? MR. HOLUM: No, I said nothing inherently -- or at least if I didn't use that qualifier, I should have -- nothing inherently bad about defending. In fact, over the long term -- and this is truly a visionary concept -- not originating with me -- but over the long term I suspect that as we get down to zero nuclear weapons in the world, which is our ultimate objective, that there will be a very strong argument for defenses that will be available to every country, just in case someone cheats or someone develops an offensive capability. That's what I mean by not inherently negative. But certainly we have to take into account the implications of moving ahead with defenses for the strategic balance and for the possibility of an offense-defense arms race. The entire premise of the ABM Treaty, as you know, is to facilitate reductions in offensive arms, because nobody things the other -- neither side thinks the other will gain an advantage. And that aspect of the issue will have to be considered very carefully when the president addresses this issue later this summer. But, again, I believe that it is possible to proceed with a very limited system, very limited capabilities aimed at third country, very primitive offensive systems, without undercutting the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty or provoking an arms race with either Russia or China. ..................... Q: Mr. Holum, my name is Jeff Mulhearn (ph) from Sydney University Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific. Going back if I might to the NMD issue, in particular the proposal for a limited capability -- I think you mentioned 100 interceptors, a radar center in Alaska, that would hopefully be able to be fitted within the other regime of the ABM Treaty and so forth. Is it not true though that one of the major concerns of China and Russia is that if the U.S. is going to spend the money, the time, the effort to invest in a limited capability that inevitably as technology changes, as the perceived need changes, these third states, these states that aren't part of the proliferation NPT regime continue with their development, that inevitably after you have reached that limited state you will want to go further and do further enhancing, further development, and hence basically that China and Russia's and others perhaps maybe don't trust that U.S. intent? How do you answer that question? MR. HOLUM: Well, it certainly is a point that they have raised. I don't think that the military experts in Russia fear this initial deployment. Frankly, I don't even think they're concerned about the phase two that may come not as part of this initial negotiation, but is certainly something the defense experts are looking ahead to. I don't even think the Russians are concerned about that -- that would go up to as many as 250 interceptors, and more ABM radars. But their missile forces are clearly capable of overwhelming or defeating a system of this kind. What they are concerned about is precisely what you say: that this permits the infrastructure for a larger system that would provide a hot production capability for interceptors. One answer, and I think a fundamentally important one, for that is that we are prepared to pursue in the context of adjustments to the treaty additional confidence-building and verification measures that would confirm that those steps aren't happening and aren't imminent. The ABM Treaty, as you know, was negotiated in 1972, that relies entirely on national technical means of verification. No intrusive on-site inspections -- anything of that kind. Now, when the treaty was amended to clarify the dividing line between permitted theater missile defenses and prohibited national missile defenses, we included some new verification measures, and we contemplate doing the same thing. So one answer is that they can have assurance based on new confidence-building and verification measures that such steps are not being taken. Another argument is sort of a negative one, not one I prefer, and that is to say this treaty has been amended before, we should be able to amend it consistently with its purposes to allow limited national missile defense. And what's the alternative? Is it a good idea to force the president of the United States to choose between a limited defense that he thinks based on good intelligence is necessary for the defense of the country -- to choose between that and the treaty -- to force the president to choose, if he decides he has to proceed, to abandon the ABM Treaty. I am not saying the president would decide that. I don't know what he would decide. He will have all the information in front of him when he confronts that decision. I hope he doesn't have to. I think it's in both the United States' interests and Russia's interests to avoid forcing that choice by making a reasonable accommodation so that defenses can proceed, but nonetheless remain constrained by the treaty. And I frankly think that any president would look very hard, if we are allowed to proceed under the treaty with the kind of defenses that are justifiable in the near term -- I think any president of either party would respect the arms control commitments of the United States. I am not pretending to speak for a new administration of either party, but looking at history recall that President Reagan was very anxious to deploy a national missile defense. Yet during all of the years of that administration in the pursuit of research and development on Star Wars and other concepts, President Reagan never abandoned the ABM Treaty. He proposed dramatic amendments to the treaty in the Standing Consultative Commissions, but never proposed to abandon the treaty. I think the United States will take its arms control commitments seriously, so long as they serve its security interests. .................. (end transcript) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)