



25 Reasons You Should Be Outraged Over the Nuclear Weapon Policies of the Clinton and Yeltsin Administrations

1. The United States and Russia refuse to take seriously their obligation under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "to pursue in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." As the World Court found, this "obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation to conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result—nuclear disarmament in all its aspect—by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith." Seven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and four years after the signing of the START II treaty, a continuous process of nuclear arms reductions, leading toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, remains to be established.
2. The United States and Russia refuse to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The United States has never had a No-First Use policy. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev declared a No-First-Use policy in the early 1980s, but no one believed him. Russia dropped its No-First Use pledge in November 1993 and adopted a strategic doctrine that resembled NATO's "flexible response" doctrine.
3. Instead of seeking every possible avenue to decrease the alert status of strategic forces, the United States has kept the operational tempo of its SLBM force at Cold War levels—keeping two-thirds of the ballistic missile submarine fleet at sea at any one time. It has also continued to purchase submarines, adding a sixteenth Trident submarine to the ballistic missile submarine force in 1995, a seventeenth in 1996, and plans to add an eighteenth in 1997. The U.S. has also decided to retrofit the remainder of the fleet with the more advanced Trident II SLBMs.
4. The United States still deploys nuclear weapons in Europe. The military rationale for this has evaporated and its purpose seems solely to maintain a political cohesiveness among NATO countries. The United States is now the only country to deploy land-based nuclear weapons outside its borders. Britain may have a few remaining bombs in Germany, but they are scheduled to be gone by the end of next year, if they are not gone already.
5. The United States and Russian governments have permitted the strategic arms negotiations to stall, leaving the U.S. and Russia each with intact nuclear weapon stockpiles in excess of 10,000 warheads.

6. Even if START II is implemented, in addition to some 4,900 operational warheads and spares, the United States is planning to maintain some 2,500 active "hedge" warheads to be able to return U.S. strategic forces to START I levels.
7. In addition to these 7,400 operational and "hedge" warheads, the United States is retaining some 3,500 intact nuclear warheads in an inactive reserve status. Comparable, or possibly even larger, numbers of reserve weapons are being retained on the Russian side.
8. In addition to these 11,000 intact warheads the United States plans to retain a strategic reserve of some 5,000 plutonium pits at Pantex and thousands of intact thermonuclear secondaries at Oak Ridge.
9. With its "in your face" NATO expansion strategy, the United States places a higher priority on maintaining its influence in European security affairs than on reducing the strategic nuclear threat represented by the huge strategic arsenals deployed by Russia and the United States.
10. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, and some of his scientific colleagues at Arzamas-16, have been pandering to Russian hard-liners by making bellicose speeches about Russia's expanded reliance on the use of tactical nuclear weapons in response to the U.S. NATO policy.
11. Despite the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the United States continues to conduct underground experiments with fissile and fusion materials and chemical high explosives, and maintains an expensive break-out capability to resume full-scale nuclear explosive testing at the Nevada Test Site. Russia continues to maintain its test facilities at Novaya Zemlya. There is no effort underway to negotiate permanent closure of these two sites.
12. Contrary to popular belief, after signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the United States continues to design, produce, certify the performance of, and deploy new nuclear weapons with improved military capabilities. The new B61-11 earth penetrator was dropped from F-16s, B-1s and B-2s in tests conducted in 1996. F-16s are based with USAF or NATO allies in Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as in the United States.
13. The United States plans to spend \$4.0 billion annually on Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship and Management over the next ten years. In constant dollars this is more than the United States spent annually (on average) on nuclear weapon design testing, production and maintenance during the Cold War.
14. The United States and Russia are each maintaining two nuclear weapon design laboratories. The United States is doing so despite the fact that one of the two labs, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is now responsible for less than 15 percent of the warheads in the U.S. operational stockpile, and despite the recommendation of a government high-level

commission—the Galvin Task Force—that the nuclear weapon programs of the two laboratories should be consolidated at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

15. As part of its Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program, the United States plans to develop and maintain the capability to design and modify nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing. This so-called “virtual testing” capability will be performed by computers using advanced nuclear weapon design codes. The codes are intended to be fully three dimensional, high resolution, and based on fundamental physics without reliance on “fudge” factors of any kind. The goal is to have the ability to model full systems in an integrated fashion. Moreover, the design codes are to be linked to CAD-CAM production engineering codes, thus, fully integrating warhead designers with the weapon production plants and creating a “virtual prototyping” capability in cyberspace.
16. The United States is committed to invest billions of dollars in inertial confinement fusion, not as a potential future source of energy, but as a source of fundamental nuclear weapon physics data to support development of 3-D design codes for “virtual testing” of nuclear weapons, and to maintain and replicate a cadre of nuclear weapon designers. The Department of Energy plans to invest over \$2 billion in the construction and operation of the National Ignition Facility, despite the fact that it does not have high confidence the facility will achieve its principal design goal of achieving fusion ignition in the laboratory.
17. Russia refuses to negotiate an Agreement for Cooperation with the United States, permitting a nuclear weapons data exchange with the United States, and refuses to declassify data related to the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, nuclear materials inventories, or the rate of dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. After Vice President Albert Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, and then Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, all agreed to a data exchange and just prior to completing the Agreement for Cooperation, Russia broke off the negotiations in 1995. Negotiations were never resumed.
18. Despite a contracting nuclear weapons stockpile, Russia is still operating two large tritium production reactors at Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65).
19. The United States is planning to maintain a stockpile of some 40 kg of tritium, far larger than what is needed. The United States is also planning to maintain a tritium production surge capability post-2005 of some 4.5 kg per year, which is two to three times what is needed.
20. Russia is still producing weapon-grade plutonium at three production reactors and separating this material. Verification measures to confirm that this material is not being converted from an oxide to a metal are not yet in place.
21. Russia is still operating at least three chemical separating plants for the purpose of recovering plutonium when it already has some 30 tons of civil plutonium which it cannot use in the foreseeable future.

22. Rather than declare it excess of weapon requirements, the United States is retaining 200 tons of highly-enriched uranium in order to provide a 100+ year supply of naval reactor fuel. There is no restriction on the reuse of this highly-enriched uranium in weapons.
23. The Department of Energy plans to continue operating two large chemical separation plants at the Savannah River Site for waste management purposes, despite the fact that one plant would suffice. At an added cost to the taxpayer of over \$100 million annually and over objections of OMB, the second plant is being retained because DOE is afraid of retribution by Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Savannah River Site is in Senator Thurmond's home state of South Carolina.
24. Even though maintaining two options for the disposal of excess plutonium from weapons—disposing of it directly as a waste after mixing it with fission products, and burning it in commercial reactors as a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX)—the Department of Energy refuses to give highest priority to developing and ultimately utilizing the direct disposal option which is more attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint.
25. To date the United States has placed only two tons of plutonium and only ten tons of highly-enriched uranium under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. This represents less than two percent of the U.S. government's weapon-usable fissile material.