

The Bush Administration's Nuclear Weapons Policy

Nuclear Program
Natural Resources Defense Council
Revised: 24 May 2002

After 17 months in office, the Bush Administration's rhetoric and record continue to demonstrate its willingness to discard or reject any treaty that significantly impinges on future U.S. flexibility to develop and employ military force in defense of its national interests. Treaties and agreements that constrain other nations' military options, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are evidently still acceptable, so long as the global gentlemen's agreement remains in place to ignore U.S. nuclear disarmament obligations under the treaty. And purely political "treaties," wrapped around future U.S. military planning objectives and devoid of meaningful technical constraints—such as the one signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002—are evidently acceptable as well, as long as they serve to ratify US military superiority and don't provide a steppingstone on the path toward a more effective international arms control and peacekeeping regimes..

The Bush Administration apparently hews to the belief that the U.S. alone is entitled to field military forces sufficient to deter, or fight and win, any conceivable conflict, and that the U.S. alone will decide when and where to commit these forces, and then organize impromptu coalitions of allied forces to support the U.S.-led war effort.

Evidence of contempt for the international legal norms governing the possession and use of military force is extensive. The Bush administration has withdrawn from the 1998 Rome Protocol, signed by President Clinton in 2000, establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC). Sixty nations had adopted the treaty, including Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Congo, Jordan, Mongolia, Niger, Romania and Slovakia. But the Bush administration has sided with Russia and China in opposing an international criminal court, on the grounds that the United States might be called to account for the decisions and actions of US officials and military personnel that result in crimes against humanity or other violations of international humanitarian law.

In June, the United States will unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty and proceed with a hugely expensive and technologically flawed effort to deploy a multi-layered ballistic missile defense.

At the recent Review Conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S. delegate informed the Parties that the U.S. government no longer subscribed to major elements of the Joint Statement of Principles signed by the nuclear weapons states in 1995 that resulted in the "indefinite extension" of the NPT Treaty, one of the major achievements of the previous administration in the area of arms control and indeed of the entire community of nations.

Equally ominous the administration is actively debating the politics and tactics of withdrawing President Clinton's signature from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, on

the grounds that the United States government no longer has any intention of ratifying it, and should thus no longer be bound by even the public perception of what it might do in the future. To prepare for CTBT withdrawal, administration officials have been secretly briefing Congress on what they describe as disturbing intelligence indicating that Russia is preparing to resume nuclear testing. These are likely sub-critical tests and of course the U.S. conducts them as well at the Nevada Test Site.

In the FY 2003 budget, the Bush Administration has requested additional funding to accelerate the Nevada test site readiness program so as to be able to resume fully diagnosed tests of new nuclear devices within 12 to 18 months of a decision to do so. It has also reestablished an "Advanced Concepts Initiative" at all three US nuclear weapons laboratories "to energize design work on advanced concepts," including nuclear weapons to defeat "Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets," and "Agent Defeat Weapons" for attacking chemical and biological warfare sites. The Bush Administration also feels free to lie about these steps to the international community, telling the NPT Parties on April 11, "The United States...is not developing new nuclear weapons," and "The United States has no plans for a resumption of nuclear testing."

The administration's assault on international arms control treaties is of a piece with its assault on the environment in the name of increased military readiness. Recently the Pentagon has sought an exemption for its training activities from environmental laws, forcing it through the House of Representatives at breakneck pace. Already on the books is a provision providing the President with blanket authority to waive environmental restrictions in the name of national defense. Not satisfied with this waiver, DOD is now promoting legislation that would empower the military to ignore environmental statutes. As initially introduced the bill included language exempting DOD activities from compliance with the Clean Air Act, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, Superfund, the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. As the bill emerged from the Armed Services Committee, its provisions were narrowed for jurisdictional reasons to remove the pollution statutes. Still included in the language are exemptions to the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. However, it is clear that there will be a major effort to expand this list on the House floor and, potentially, again when House and Senate conferees meet to reconcile their differences on the bill.

On May 24, 2002, at the Moscow summit, Presidents Bush and Putin signed an arms control treaty that President Bush, in an expression of self-serving political hype has claimed "will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War." A closer look at the treaty shows that it is likely to prolong the U.S. Russian nuclear standoff for years to come, and encourage nuclear proliferation.

The treaty limits US and Russian deployed strategic offensive arsenals to 2200 warheads each, but this constraint **will be in force for a period of less than a day—a period shorter than the blink of an eye at the stroke of midnight on December 30, 2012—after which the entire agreement expires.** Physicists would characterize the constraints using a "delta" function—a function having a spike-like shape with an

infinitely small width and infinite height, so that the area under the "curve" is equal to one.

Before and after instant the number of nuclear warheads mounted on strategic nuclear missiles and bombers may exceed the treaty's maximum "limit" of 2,200 operational strategic warheads. The treaty likewise contains no limit on the number of warheads that may be kept in storage as a "reserve" force, meaning that potentially thousands of weapons on both sides could be remounted on missiles and bombers within days or months, depending on the type of delivery vehicle.

The range of 1,700 to 2,200 active deployed strategic offensive warheads is essentially the same as the 2,000 to 2,500 active offensive strategic warheads that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on at Helsinki in 1997 as the framework for a START III treaty.. Russia subsequently recommended cutting strategic offensive warheads to 1,500 warheads. The Joint Chiefs and U.S. Strategic Command refused to go below the Helsinki limit of 2,500 warheads, a limit they accepted in 1997. Bush team wanted to give the appearance of cutting the warheads below the Clinton number, so they changed the counting rule from "strategic warheads" to "operationally deployed strategic weapons" thereby not counting a few hundred warheads associated with strategic submarines and bombers undergoing overhaul.

The lower limit of 1,700 deployed strategic offensive warheads is pure window dressing. It has no binding effect whatsoever. It is there to avoid the appearance that Russia got nothing out of the negotiations, and to give the appearance that Bush is cutting more than Clinton.

President Bush, five years after Helsinki, uses the same ten-year implementation period, thus delaying the Clinton-Yeltsin Helsinki schedule another five years. This treaty imposes no constraint on the Bush team. It does not take effect until four years after the Bush administration leaves office, even if Bush is elected to a second term.

The treaty does not require the elimination of a single missile silo, submarine, missile, bomber, nuclear warhead or bomb. The treaty merely requires that operational strategic nuclear force loadings be reduced to 2,200 warheads on the last day of 2012, after which the treaty expires. This is the kind of treaty that Saddam Hussein would love.

The treaty drops the required elimination of MIRVed heavy missiles under START II, increasing the Russian incentive to launch on warning. START II negotiated by the president's father was ratified by the United States Senate on January 26, 1996 by a vote of 87 to 4. Russia subsequently ratified the treaty with a negotiated protocol extending the implementation deadline for five years. In the view of the U.S. Senate, this change required a second vote for the treaty to enter into force, a vote that never happened because of Republican insistence on linking it to consideration (i.e., rejection) of a new protocol on ABM testing parameters that might have preserved the ABM Treaty. President George W. Bush has simply walked away from START II.

The treaty does not require accounting for or destruction of any non-strategic nuclear weapons, including the thousands of Russian tactical nuclear weapons.

The treaty lacks any verification provisions. What happened to President Reagan's injunction, "Trust, but verify"? The Bush team will try to give the appearance that the 453-word treaty has verification provisions, by agreeing that the START I Treaty will remain in force. President Bush has abandoned the verification provisions the Clinton administration planned to seek during START III negotiations. Perhaps we should be grateful that President Bush did not withdraw from START I as well.

This treaty is a sham, and will do nothing to make Americans or Russians more secure. It is an arms reduction step backwards, not forward. It is a victory for STRATCOM, which sought to preserve indefinitely the SIOP major attack option to preemptively strike Russian nuclear forces with some 2000 warheads, resulting in some 10 to 20 million Russian casualties, while retaining the remaining 20 percent of its operational warheads to deter the Chinese and other nuclear powers from launching WW-IV.

While attempting to take credit for liquidating the Cold War, the President is actually insuring that through 2012 we will retain more stockpiled nuclear warheads than we had in the late 1950s. The President's 2012 arsenal of operationally deployed warheads has the explosive yield equivalent to 42,000 Hiroshima bombs.

The future U.S. nuclear weapons employment policy is detailed in the Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, mandated by Congress in the fall of 2000 and submitted to the congress last February. The NPR establishes the broad outline of Pentagon planning for U.S. nuclear strategy, force levels and infrastructure for the next 10 years and beyond. It also endorses significant revisions to the nuclear war planning process to enhance its flexibility and responsiveness, which would allow the Pentagon to generate new nuclear attack plans and have them approved quickly in a crisis.

Some of the highlights of this report are as follows:

- The Pentagon has redefined the TRIAD. The old TRIAD was composed of ICBMs, SLBMs and strategic bombers. The new TRIAD is composed of:
 - Offensive strike forces (both nuclear and non-nuclear, conventional and non[un]-conventional??);
 - Defenses (both active and passive); and
 - A revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.

The old TRIAD is now a part of one leg of the new TRIAD.

- The Pentagon assumes that nuclear weapons will be part of U.S. military forces for at least the next 50 years. Plans are to replace the Minuteman missile with a new ICBM

in 2020, TRIDENT submarines and missiles in 2030, and a new heavy bomber in 2040, as well as new warheads for all of them.

- The Pentagon plans to reduce operationally deployed strategic forces from 8,000 warheads today to 3,800 in 2007, with the goal of reaching 2,200 or fewer operationally deployed weapons in 2012. As indicated earlier the real treaty limit is 2,200 operational warheads in 2012, not 1700.
- The administration plans to deactivate the MX/Peacekeeper ICBMs in phases over a three-year period beginning October 1, 2002. It will withdraw them in conjunction with introducing Trident II missiles into the Pacific, thereby ensuring that there will be no degradation in US "hard target kill capability." Current plans call for the MX silos to be retained, rather than destroyed as specified in the SALT and START treaties. MX missile stages and nuclear warheads will also be retained.
- The administration plans to cut the number of Trident ballistic missile submarines from 18 to 14 by FY2007 (of which two in overhaul at any given time will not be considered part of the "operationally deployed force"). Four Trident SSBNs will be converted to each carry up to 154 conventional cruise missiles. The submarines also may be used to support Special Operations Forces now part of the TRIAD.
- After these initial modest force reductions, the NPR provides that "no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from strategic service."
- Each of the 500 Minuteman III ICBMs to be retained and modernized under the administration's plan will be equipped with a single reentry vehicle/warhead combination.
- The Pentagon is considering extending the life of the dual-capable F-16C/D and F-15E, or making some of the new Joint Strike Fighters nuclear capable.
- Over the next 10 years, the Bush administration's plans call for the United States to retain a total stockpile of intact nuclear weapons and weapon components that is roughly seven to nine times larger than the publicly stated goal of 1,700 to 2,200 "operationally deployed weapons." This is an accounting system worthy of Enron. The operationally deployed weapons are only the visible portion of a huge, hidden arsenal. To the "accountable" tally of 2,200 one must add the following:
 - ~240 missile warheads on the two Trident submarines in overhaul at any given time;
 - + ~1,350 strategic missile and bomber warheads in the "responsive force";
 - + ~800 "nonstrategic" bombs assigned to U.S./NATO "dual-capable" aircraft;
 - + ~320 "nonstrategic" sea-launched cruise missile warheads in the "responsive force;"
 - + ~160 "spare" strategic and non-strategic warheads;
 - + ~4,900 intact warheads in the "inactive reserve" stockpile;

- = ~7,800 intact warheads;
- + ~5,000 stored plutonium "primary" and HEU "secondary" components that could be reassembled into weapons

Out of some 10,600 warheads on the stockpile today, the Bush Administration plans to remove from the stockpile only 600 warheads, the W62, and this will not occur for another seven years.

- In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions are made among contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies are categorized as "immediate, potential or unexpected". Russia, although not an enemy, has a military and industrial target base that imposes significant "requirements" on the size and character of U.S. nuclear forces. In addition, current examples of the Pentagon's immediate contingencies include an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation with China over the status of Taiwan. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies. China could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency.
- The Pentagon will not eliminate the relatively inflexible nuclear "counterforce" Major Attack Options that characterized the Cold War nuclear planning process, despite the administration's pronouncements about being in a post-Cold War world. Instead, the administration will scale the attack options to the size required to preemptively attack Russian nuclear forces, and supplement them by an "adaptive planning" process that anticipates a range of nuclear contingencies and is flexible enough to respond quickly where and when a crisis occurs.
- In the event of an international crisis, "the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture" by returning weapons from what henceforth will be labeled a "responsive" reserve back to the "operationally deployed" force. As noted, this "uploading" could be accomplished in a period ranging from days or weeks to months or years, depending on the particular weapon system.
- The administration plans to integrate missile defense into the New TRIAD, which will supposedly enhance the United States' ability "to use its power projection forces" by "improving the ability to counterattack an enemy," and may also provide the president with "an option to manage a crisis" involving "one or more" opponents with weapons of mass destruction.
- The administration believes that deploying missile defenses will increase the United States' ability to "counteract WMD-backed coercive threats" by defeating small-scale missile attacks intended to coerce the United States into abandoning an embattled "ally or friend." The administration believes that missile defenses can have a "dissuasive effect" on potential adversaries by making it "more arduous and costly for an adversary to compete militarily with or wage war against the United States."
- The administration is considering an "emergency missile defense capability" for the 2003-2008 time period consisting of a single Airborne Laser for "limited operations" against "ballistic missiles of all ranges," a "rudimentary" Alaska-based midcourse interceptor system against "longer-range threats," and a sea-based Aegis system with

“rudimentary midcourse capability” against “short-to-medium range threats.” Based on the technical progress achieved with these early systems, the United States could deploy “operational capabilities” in the 2006-2008 time frame

- The administration believes that our military satellites are not “optimized” for the “current and developing mobile target challenge.” Consequently, the DoD plans to develop extensive new real-time intelligence systems and long-range precision strike weapons to “dissuade a potential adversary from investing heavily in mobile ballistic missiles” or other “threatening capabilities.” Planned improvements would provide the capability to rapidly locate and track mobile targets “from the time they deploy from garrison until they return.”
- The administration plans to revitalize U.S. nuclear infrastructure with the capacity to: upgrade existing systems, “surge” production of weapons, and develop and field “entirely new systems.” All of this is designed to “discourage” other countries from “competing militarily with the United States.”
- The administration believes that the current arsenal—a subset of what was in place at the end of the Cold War—is not what is needed for the future. That arsenal was developed and deployed mainly to deter the former Soviet Union and to carry out the “Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).” In the administration’s view, significantly modified and quite possibly new nuclear warheads will be required to accomplish new military missions, and thus the NPR calls for a revitalized nuclear weapon complex that could, if directed, design, develop, manufacture and certify new warheads. The administration believes that the development of this arsenal must begin now because it will take much longer than a decade to complete. This arsenal would have the capability to target and destroy mobile and re-locatable targets and hard and deeply buried targets.
- The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) is reestablishing advanced warhead concept design teams at each of the three design laboratories – Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories – “to energize design work on advanced concepts.” This initiative will focus on “evolving DoD requirements,” including nuclear weapons to defeat “Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets” and “Agent Defeat Weapons” for attacking chemical and biological warfare sites, and to reduce collateral damage via improved accuracy and variable and reduced yields. The labs are examining how to repack an existing warhead, the B61 or the B83 bomb, to provide a more effective earth-penetrator (“bunkerbuster”) weapon. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is working on a new warhead to destroy biological or chemical weapons. The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board has been asked to examine a new nuclear anti-ballistic missile warhead, in light of the poor performance of the conventional hit-to-kill warhead.
- The NNSA is launching a program to enhance nuclear explosive test readiness at the Nevada Test Site by “replacing key underground-test-unique components,” modernizing test diagnostic capabilities, augmenting key personnel, increasing their proficiency in underground test operations, conducting “test-related exercises of appropriate fidelity,” and shortening the time required to show “regulatory and safety compliance.”

- Plans are underway to expand the capacity and capability of the NNSA's Pantex nuclear weapons assembly-disassembly plant near Amarillo, Texas, to meet a planned workload of some 600 warheads (assembled or dismantled) per year, up from the current capacity of 350 warheads per year.
- For the "long term," the NPR projects the need for "a new modern production facility" to deal with the "large-scale replacement" of plutonium components and "new production." The NNSA is "accelerating preliminary design work" on a "modern pit manufacturing facility" so that new production capacity can be "brought on line when it is needed."
- The NNSA is embarked on a seven- to eight-year project to expand the capacity and capability of the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to meet the planned workload for replacing nuclear warhead secondary stages and other uranium components.

A strong case can be made that the nuclear weapons policies and programs laid out in the NPR effectively preclude further U.S. "good faith" participation in international negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Good faith participation in such negotiations, leading to the achievement of "effective measures" (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) "relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," is a legal and political obligation of all parties under Article VI of the nearly universal nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that entered into force in 1970. The Bush administration posture of avoiding further binding legal constraints on the U.S. nuclear arsenal, while pursuing the reinvigoration of the U.S. nuclear weapons production complex and the development of new nuclear weapons, will be viewed by many nations as a blatant breach of the "good faith" negotiating standard under the treaty, and tantamount to a U.S. "breakout" from the NPT.

Table 1. Nuclear Forces (January 2002)

25-Mar-02

Type	WHs per Launcher	Launchers		Active Warheads				Inactive Warheads	Total Warheads	
		Operational	Overhaul	Deployed	Responsive		Total			
					Operational	Overhaul				Spares
Strategic Forces:										
ICBMs										
MM-III				500						
W62	1			150				150	300	450
W62	3			150			15	165		165
W78	3			900			20	920		920
Peacekeeper										
W87	10			500			50	550		550
Subtotal (ICBM)				1700	0	0	85	1785	300	2085
SSBN		16	2							
SLBM										
Trident I C4/W76	6	144	24	864		144		1008		1008
Trident II D5/W76	8	192	24	1536		192	156	1884	308	2192
Trident II D5/W88	8	48	0	384			16	400		400
Subtotal (SLBM)		384	48	2784	0	336	172	3292	308	3600
Strategic Bombers										
B-52H	16	56	41							
B-2	16	16	5							
B61-7				350			20	370	100	470
B61-11				50			5	55	200	255
B83-0									200	200
B83-1				400			20	420	900	1320
W80-1 (ACM/ALCM)				860			40	900	900	1800
Subtotal (Strategic Bombers)		72	46	1660	0	0	85	1745	1200	2945
Subtotal (Strategic)				6144	0	336	342	6822	1808	8630
Non-Strategic Force:										
F-16C/D										
F-15E										
B-61-3,4,10				800			40	840	450	1290
SLCM/W80-0							320	320	400	720
GLCM/W84									400	400
Subtotal (Non-strategic)				800	0	320	40	1160	850	2010
Total Warheads				6944	336	320	382	7982	2658	10,640

Table 1. Nuclear Forces (January 2002)

13-Feb-02

Type	WHs per Launcher	Launchers		Active Warheads				Inactive Warheads	Total Warheads	
		Deployed		Deployed		Responsive	Spares			Total
		Operational	Overhaul	Operational	Overhaul					
Strategic Forces:										
ICBMs										
MM-III		500								
W62	1	150		150			150	300	450	
W62	3	50		150			15	165	165	
W78	3	300		900			20	920	920	
Peacekeeper		50								
W87	10	50		500			50	550	550	
Subtotal (ICBM)		550	0	1700	0	0	85	1785	300	2085
SSBN		16	2							
SLBM										
W76	6	142	24	852	144			996	996	
W76	8	192	24	1536	192		140	1868	336	2204
W88	6	2	0	12				12	12	
W88	8	46	0	368			20	388	388	
Subtotal (SLBM)		382	48	2768	336	0	160	3264	336	3600
Strategic Bombers										
B-52H	16	56	41							
B-2	16	16	5							
B61-7				350			20	370	100	470
B61-11				50			5	55		55
B83-0									200	200
B83-1				400			20	420		420
W80-1 (ACM/ALCM)				860			40	900	900	1800
Subtotal (Strategic Bombers)		72	46	1660	0	0	85	1745	1200	2945
Subtotal (Strategic)				6128	336	0	330	6794	1836	8630
Non-Strategic Force:										
F-16C/D										
F-15E										
B-61-3,4,10				800			40	840	450	1290
SLCM/W80-0						320	0	320		320
GLCM/W84									400	400
Subtotal (Non-strategic)				800	0	320	40	1160	850	2010
Total Warheads				6928	336	320	370	7954	2686	10,640

Table 3. Nuclear Forces (2012; Conceptual)

13-Feb-02

Type	WHs per Launcher	Launchers		Active Warheads				Inactive Warheads	Total Warheads		
		Deployed		Operational	Overhaul	Deployed	Responsive			Spares	Total
		Operational	Overhaul								
Strategic Forces:											
ICBMs											
MM-III	1			300			300	15	615	300	915
W78				200				20	220	300	520
W87	1			500	0		300	35	835	600	1435
Subtotal (ICBM)											
SSBN		12	2								
SLBM											
W76	5	212	48	1060	240		400	40	1740	1460	3200
W88	5	76	0	380				20	400	400	400
Subtotal (SLBM)		288	48	1440	240		400	60	2140	1460	3600
Strategic Bombers											
B-52H	16	56	20								
B-2	16	16	5								
B61-7				60			100	5	165	300	465
B61-11				50				5	55		55
B83-0										200	200
B83-1				60			150	5	215	200	415
W80-1 (ACM/ALCM)				90			400	10	500	1300	1800
Subtotal (Strategic Bombers)		72	25	260	0		650	25	935	2000	2935
Subtotal (Strategic)				2200	240		1350	120	3910	4060	7970
Non-Strategic Force:											
F-16C/D											
F-15E											
B-61-3,4,10				800			320	0	840	450	1290
SLCM/W80-0											320
GLCM/W84											400
Subtotal (Non-strategic)				800	0		320	40	1160	850	2010
Total Warheads				3000	240		1670	160	5070	4910	9,980

U.S. SSBNs

SSBN	Ocean	Status	nch/SSBN	SLBM Type	WH/SLBM	D5/W76	C4/W76	D5/W88
1	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8			192
2	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8			192
3	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
4	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
5	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
6	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
7	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
8	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
9	Atlantic	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
10	Atlantic	Overhaul	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
11	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident II D5	8	192		
12	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
13	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
14	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
15	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
16	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
17	Pacific	Operational	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
18	Pacific	Overhaul	24	Trident I C4	6		144	
Operational Launchers			384					
Total Launchers			432					
Total Operational Warheads						1536	864	384
Total Deployed Warheads						1728	1008	384
Spares							156	16
Total (W76/W88)							2892	400
Trident I C4 W76 X 6			432					
Trident II D5 Mk-4/W76 X 6			144					
Trident II D5 (Operational)			216					
Trident II D5 (Overhaul)			24					
Total Operational Warheads (Atlantic)					1728			
Total Operational Warheads (Pacific)					1056			
Total Operational Warheads					2784			
Total Overhaul Warheads					336			
Total Deployed Warheads					3120			
Total Spares					172			
Total Warheads					3292			

25-Mar-02

All WHs

2784
3120
172
3292
